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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
v. 
JOHN QUAS, Case No. 890601-CA 
: Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant. 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court by Utah Code 
Ann. section 78-2a-3(2)(j), which provides jurisdiction over 
"cases transferred to the Court of Appeals from the Supreme 
Court." 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
1. Did the magistrate presiding over successive 
preliminary hearings violate the Utah Constitution's guarantee of 
due process by basing the reversal of the initial order of 
dismissal for insufficient evidence on evidence that was 
reasonably available at the first preliminary hearing? 
2. Should the district court have exercised its 
jurisdiction to quash the improper bindover order? 
3. Did the trial court commit prejudicial error under 
Utah Rules of Evidence 403, 404, and 702, and Appellantfs right 
to a jury trial in allowing various expert witnesses to testify 
concerning Susan Quas's failure, as explained by the physical 
evidence, to comport with norms of committing suicide? 
4. Did the district court commit prejudicial error in 
1 
refusing to suppress Appellant's statements, which were obtained 
through violation of Appellant's rights against self-
incrimination? 
5. Did the district court commit prejudicial error 
under Utah Rules of Evidence 402, 403, and 802 in admitting the 
hearsay statements of Susan Quas? 
6. Did the district court violate Appellant's rights to 
a fair trial by refusing to present to the jury Appellant's 
reasonable doubt and flight instructions? 
STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
The texts of those statutes and constitutional 
provisions that do not appear in the body of the brief are 
included in Appendix 5. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Appellant was convicted by a jury of second degree 
homicide and sentenced to serve a term of five years to life at 
the Utah State prison, in addition to a one to five year firearm 
enhancement term (R. 600-601). 
There were two preliminary hearings in this case 
because the State failed to present sufficient evidence to 
support a bindover order at the first preliminary hearing (R. 
12). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Appellant and Susan Quas were married in June of 1984, 
and moved from Nevada to Utah, hoping to leave their alcohol-
dominated lifestyle behind them (T. 803). While the Quases were 
2 
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m u s i c i a n s t c ^or, \ wit ; i f bOi- iei i^eb x - -
8-4 U " ^ ' ^ I ' -r ; *"' - i e DO St , f: IC*. . :)d Wclb 3 JU^ : 
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On J u n e 15, . \Jc$ , DUSUII ^ u a o . . .. : . jir . - ui i 
t . i I 11 < h ' / . 
That, ^jgut nn unt fir u^o 
events at trie Quas residence '.\ere i.ois^, - .i *. .^as; 
Quas- "! r~d a i echo1' level reached .22, and . •. 
vitreous ai^iiuj ^ v. *. . * : * .sorrr r^i " 
M:r::«- * he everiLia, her hiu>od alcohol jt-vei A-IS LLU'. U^~;, 
•,*.-.•- . - _ * ) - * . * . i ri n k LI A : - !iat i 1-. J • 
but not ti :it; pui.i
 f;/^:^_a'. • * 
moments pri T -O Susan's death, she u:<; nppej <,!.... ... .. aiJ.,.nq 
4 
an- _- , ^  .. i f- ' usciii was handling a gun and 
There was o ~^u^ .*<_ _ ot eviu-iice -hat Susan and 
Appellant frequently drank to excess (e * . ' =54, 29 } „ J 14-
315, 500, 510, 519)-. 
When a person ^ ^.^^u a; v • ^ . ie1 reaches .08, the 
p ^ s A - :s legally too intoxicated tu drive ""•"**. 
.iujLuu^ .x ._,.«.- JL nc. . .in dcohol prol : e *. 
805-60*::,* t » „,3d that he continued to drink throughj...t tne 
course of the evening and also took a librium (T. 833), 
While Appellant was in custody and subjected to 
interrogation and a gunshot, residue test, and asked to sign a 
form consenting to the search ^^ M>_- home, rd o^ " alcoh^" *-^^~s 
were performed •-• "^ne] lari+-
Police officers who had responded to it-H^ -ciu^ o 
complaints of domestic disputes at the Quas residence notedf <md 
Appellant confirmed, that the Quases made a nabit cf drinking and 
fighting (T. 245, 2^4, 291-293). WrI 1e Appellant's participation 
in these fights was limited to argument (T. 796), Susan Quas was 
also physically violent (T. 744-754, 784-79] ) and was arrested 
for spouse abuse ( 
3 
threatening to commit suicide. (824-827). Apparently secure 
that nothing out of the ordinary would happen, Appellant told 
Susan that her ploys wouldn't stop him from leaving, and went 
into the shower (826-828). 
After the shot fired, Appellant put on a bathrobe, 
examined Susan, spent a moment of distress figuring out whom to 
call, and finally called for emergency assistance (T. 197-201, 
203, 829-831), but it was too late (T. 239-240). The officers 
Susan and John Quas frequently discussed with one 
another and others the possibility of divorce (T. 757, 761-763, 7 
4 The Quases kept four guns in their house (T. 812-813). 
Mark Knudson, who lived with the Quases prior to 
Susan's death, saw Susan handling a gun during an argument with 
her husband (T. 783-787). Appellant also noted that Susan 
frequently handled guns while she was drinking (T. 814-816). 
5 Susan had threatened suicide before, and was arrested 
once after she refused medical treatment for her wrist, which she 
had slit (T. 741)). 
6 The evidence was unclear about when the shot fired. 
Appellant's call to the emergency service people was logged in at 
9:41 p.m. (T. 197-201). The paramedics arrived at the Quas 
residence at 9:45 p.m., examined Susan Quas, and determined that 
she had been dead between ten and thirty minutes (T. 322-323). 
Mr. Wassmer, living near the Quas residence heard no shot during 
the twenty minutes prior to the arrival of the emergency service 
people (T. 207-211). Ms. Young, living near the Quases, 
indicated that she didn't hear any shots during the fifteen or 
twenty minutes prior to the arrival of the police, who arrived at 
9:15 or 9:20 (T. 221). 
A friend of the Quases, Kristine Knudson, who divorced 
her husband, Mark Knudson (who was also friends with the Quases), 
and moved in with Appellant after Susan Quas died, testified for 
the State after she and Appellant parted ways (T. 494-511). Ms. 
Knudson testified that Appellant told her different things about 
what he did after the shot fired: one time he told her he came 
out and put a sheet under her head; another time he told her he 
went downstairs and checked the wash prior to calling for 
assistance because he knew Susan was already dead (T. 497-500, 
504-505). 
4 
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7 jfficer Ecwards testified at the first preliminary 
hearing that- the State's expert, Scott Pratt, who examined the 
gun, indicated that it might not have been wiped (P.H.I 67-68). 
But Officer Edwards subsequently indicated twice that the gun had 
been wiped . -:-.2 34; T. 399), , -asmuch as officer Edwards was 
the chief investigating officei ..:: the scene, and was a , i ;K jr. 
the chain of evidence leading to tht --ii *i\<i of the gun, perhaps 
he did have persona] Knowledge that the -u.:. -id be^r. w:p-?d 
8 omith *J\ une State Crime Laboratory indicated that 
Appellant's gunshot residue test results indicated elements 
consistent with, but not unique to, gunshot residue (T. ?4^\. 
Appellant was fertilizing the lawn with a liquid 
greening agent that day (T. 818-819), and lawn fertilizers 
contain elements in common with gunshot residue (T. 617-618). 
Mr. Gaskill of the Weber State College laboratory 
performed tests excluding lawn fertilisers, \nd f---^^o n<- ri.nshot 
residue :. ..pro! lar+ 'c -*-.-.c+ '•-, f!E'. 
; ie gunshot residue tests were pex tormeo ^n Jus.;; ^ -as 
as if she nad shot the gun in the traditional manner, with ner 
index finger (T. 656-657). But the evidence indicated that 
perhaps she shot the gun with her t-i.im'" whi ] e pointing the ^ 
5 
Officer Edwards found a low velocity spatter of type A 
blood on the carpet runner leading to the basement (T. 409). By 
stipulation, the State established that Appellant has type B 
blood, and that Susan Quas fell within the forty per cent of the 
population with type A blood (T. 624-626, 648-649). Although 
numerous other items were tested for blood, this was apparently 
the only type A blood found in the Quas home that was away from 
Susan's corpse (State's Exhibit 39). Dr. Grey noted at the 
autopsy that Susan was suffering from numerous injuries, 
including cuts in various stages of healing (T. 666-668). When 
Susan slit her wrist on May 3, 1987, she was dripping blood (T. 
738, 789). 
Part of the reason that the State's witnesses concluded 
that Susan Quas did not shoot herself was the absence of debris 
that normally blow back from a target shot at such a close range 
onto the gun and trigger hand (T. 406-408, 482, 492, 665-666). 
But there was also testimony from the State's experts that the 
absence of "blow back" on Susan did not preclude the possibility 
herself (T. 680-682, 815). Thus, the gunshot residue test 
performed on Susan Quas may have been incomplete (T. 580). 
There was testimony that gunshot residue is transitory 
(T. 578), and that Susan was covered with a sheet that was moved 
(T. 443), and that she was handled by several medical and 
investigating people (T. 239-240, 320-323, 416, 650-654) in such 
a way that a spatter of blood on her right arm disappeared before 
her autopsy when the gunshot residue test was taken (compare 
State's Exhibit 43 and Defense Exhibit 2 with State's Exhibits 
50-51). 
The State's experts indicated that the negative gunshot 
residue test did not exclude the possibility that Susan shot 
herself (T. 541, 684). 
6 
10 
that she shot herself (T. 613-614, 679). While the police were 
careful to establish that Appellant's hands were dirty (Compare 
State's Exhibit 29 with P.H.I 11, 18, 32, 49; P.H.2 20; T. 307, 
339, 356, 377), there was no indication that he bore any blood 
spatter or other blow back debris. 
The State presented testimony from Sherrie Mayer, the 
spurned mother of Appellant's daughter, indicating that between 
the first and second preliminary hearing, Appellant made several 
statements to her, including the statement, "Sherrie, if I can 
get away with murder, I can get away with anything." (T. 512-
521). 
Through stipulation, it was established that Shauna 
Mayer, Appellant's and Sherrie Mayer's daughter, called Appellant 
when he was staying with his parents in Tonopah, Nevada, leaving 
11 
the following message in August or September of 1988: 
My mom wants that $450 you owe her. 
That's my school clothes money. And if you 
don't pay it, then you're — we are going to 
call Detective Edwards. You promised her 
you'd pay it John — Johnny little boy. 
(T. 802-803). 
Inadmissible evidence presented by the State is omitted 
from the statement of facts, and discussed infra in points III 
10 The large blood spatter on Susan's right arm 
disappeared between the photographing and the Quas residence and 
the photographing at the autopsy. Perhaps blow back debris 
disappeared during the course of the investigation as well. 
Compare State Exhibit 43 and Defense Exhibit 2 with State's 
Exhibits 50 and 51. 
11 The information was refiled in July of 1988 (R. 255-
257). 
7 
through V of the argument. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The first preliminary hearing in this case ended in an 
order of dismissal because the prosecution refused to present 
gunshot residue evidence, and thus did not establish probable 
cause to bind the case over. This order of dismissal was 
reversed after a second preliminary hearing at which the State 
presented the requested gunshot residue evidence, and at which 
the State presented additional evidence for the stated purpose of 
insuring that the conviction would withstand appellate review. 
However, according to the Utah Constitution, any 
reversal of the initial order of dismissal should have been 
based on evidence that was not reasonably available at the 
initial preliminary hearing. Inasmuch as the gunshot residue 
evidence was available at the first preliminary hearing (as was 
the majority of the evidence presented by the State at the second 
preliminary hearing), and inasmuch as the previously unavailable 
evidence presented at the second preliminary hearing was 
presented to create the appearance of fairnejss in the appellate 
record, the reversal of the dismissal was improper. 
The district court, after determining that its case 
load was heavier than this Court's, interpreted its jurisdiction 
over the improper bindover order as preempted by this Court's 
appellate jurisdiction over circuit courts. The district court 
had jurisdiction to quash the defective bindover order, and in 
failing to exercise it, expended a great deal of limited judicial 
8 
resources for naught. 
The trial court allowed the presentation of "expert" 
testimony that Susan Quas was proven by statistics to be a 
homicide victim, because in the experience of the experts, no 
other suicide involved a victim holding a gun several inches away 
from herself and shooting into the eye. There was inadequate 
foundation for this expert testimony, which was inadmissible 
character evidence. Thus, the admission of this evidence 
violated Utah Rules of Evidence 702 and 404. Because this 
evidence distracted the jurors from their duty to focus on the 
evidence in this case, its admission violated Utah Rule of 
Evidence 403. In allowing the prosecutor to argue that these 
experienced experts had used this extraneous evidence to reach 
their professional opinion that Susan Quas was a homicide victim, 
and to argue that these experts had already reached a level of 
professional certainty meeting or exceeding the beyond a 
reasonable doubt standard of proof, the court violated 
Appellant's right to a jury trial. 
The State presented numerous statements of Appellant 
without meeting its burden of demonstrating that Appellant was 
informed of his rights and waived those rights in a knowing, 
intelligent and voluntary manner prior to speaking with the 
police. Appellant was suspected of homicide and deprived of his 
freedom of action from moments after the first police officers 
arrived. Four hours later, Appellant was informed of his rights, 
invoked his right to counsel, and was interrogated further. In 
9 
these circumstances, under Article I section 12 of the Utah 
Constitution, the State had no business presenting Appellant's 
statements taken by the police officers. 
The State presented statements of Susan Quas predicting 
that Appellant would kill her and someday the police would come 
and find her dead. Regardless of the possibility that Susan Quas 
committed suicide, these statements, when viewed in context, were 
irrelevant. Particularly because the State had expert testimony 
that Susan Quas was not a suicidal person, the admission of these 
statements was unnecessary. Given the strikingly prejudicial 
nature of these statements, under Utah Rule of Evidence 403, they 
should have been excluded. 
The trial court refused to give Appellant's appropriate 
instructions on flight and the beyond a reasonable doubt standard 
of proof. Particularly because the jurors were instructed 
incorrectly concerning the standard of proof to apply, and 
because the prosecutor was allowed to tell them that inadmissible 
evidence had already demonstrated Appellant"s guilt beyond a 
reasonable doubt, the trial court's failure to give Appellant's 
instructions violated Appellant's right to a fair trial. 
The cumulative prejudice caused by these errors 
entitles Appellant to an order of reversal and dismissal. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
THE MAGISTRATE VIOLATED APPELLANT'S 
RIGHTS TO DUE PROCESS BY BASING A BINDOVER ORDER 
AT A SUCCESSIVE PRELIMINARY HEARING 
ON EVIDENCE THAT WAS AVAILABLE 
AT A PRIOR PRELIMINARY HEARING. 
10 
A, PERTINENT CASE HISTORY 
The first preliminary hearing in this case was held 
before Magistrate Eleanor Van Sciver on July 23, July 31, and 
] 2 
August 3 of 1987. Over Appellant's objection, in the middle of 
the hearing, the magistrate continued the hearing for one week, 
in order to facilitate the State's presentation of evidence in 
support of probable cause (P.H.I 118-121). Prior to doing so, 
the magistrate indicated the weaknesses in the State's case, 
including the absence of the results of the gunshot residue tests 
and the foundation for those tests (P.H.I 111-121). 
At the continuation of the first preliminary hearing, 
Dr. Grey of the Medical Examiner's Office was allowed to testify 
that he concluded that Susan Quas was a homicide victim, based in 
part on the gunshot residue tests (P.H.I 143-148). But no 
evidence concerning those tests or the test results was presented 
by the State at the first preliminary hearing. 
After the magistrate again expressed her lack of 
satisfaction with the evidence presented by the State, the 
prosecutor indicated that the case would stand as presented, and 
the magistrate indicated that she would consider over the weekend 
Appellant's motion to dismiss the information (P.H.I 167-169). 
After considering the matter over the weekend, the magistrate 
12 The transcript of the first preliminary hearing will 
be referred to as P.H.I. There are two copies of P.H.I in the 
appellate record in this case, and one of these copies has been 
paginated by the district court. To minimize confusion, 
Appellant will refer to the pagination provided by the court 
reporter. 
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found insufficient evidence to bind the case over (P.H.I 181-
182) . 
The second preliminary hearing was scheduled to occur 
on October 18, 1988, but Appellant did not appear at that 
13 
hearing, due to car trouble. In Appellant's absence that day, 
the magistrate indicated that the reason she didn't bind the case 
over after the first preliminary hearing wcis that the State's 
case hinged on the results of the gunshot residue tests (for 
example, the Medical Examiner, Dr. Grey's conclusion that Susan 
Quas was murdered was based in part on the results of the gunshot 
residue tests), which the prosecutor, Mr. McConkie, had told the 
14 
magistrate not to consider (T.814 2-4). The magistrate 
13 The transcript of that hearing on October 18, 1988, 
will be referred to hereinafter as T.814. Pertinent pages of 
that transcript are attached in Appendix 1. 
14 Mr. McConkie did not explain on the record his 
tactical choice not to submit the gunshot residue tests, but 
there were weaknesses in that evidence that he may not have 
wished to reveal sooner than necessary. 
For example, the gunshot residue tests performed in 
this case were irrelevant to the unusual shooting of Susan Quas. 
The gunshot residue tests done on Susan Quas and those testfiring 
the gun were performed in the manner in which all gunshot residue 
tests are traditionally performed - as if she pulled the trigger 
with her index finger while shooting away from herself (and hence 
the gunshot residue tests checked for gunshot residue on the 
webbing between the thumb and index finger, and on the back of 
the hand)(T. 656-657). Because the evidence indicated that Susan 
Quas pulled the trigger with her thumb and while the gun was 
pointed toward herself (T. 815, 680-682), the gunshot residue 
tests should have been performed in a manner conforming with this 
evidence in order to be accurate (T. 580). 
For example, the gunshot residue tests performed on 
Appellant were inconsistent; one presented at trial found 
particles consistent with but not exclusive to gunshot residue, 
one presented at trial indicated no gunshot residue (T. 539, 
615). 
Or perhaps there were ethical reasons why Mr. McConkie 
12 
indicated that if the State would submit the gunshot residue 
tests at the second preliminary hearing, the magistrate would 
consider the Medical Examiner's opinion admissible, and bind the 
case over (T.814 5). 
Mr. Matheson, the prosecutor in the second preliminary 
hearing, indicated that the State would be happy to present the 
results of the gunshot residue tests, but noted that "to the 
extent that this becomes a review issue later on", the State 
might need to present some additional evidence (T. 814 6-7). 
The magistrate indicated that additional evidence could 
be submitted at the second preliminary hearing, but asked Mr. 
Matheson if it would be proper to bind the case over at the 
successive preliminary hearing as a result of the presentation of 
the gunshot residue tests that the State chose not to present at 
a prior preliminary hearing (T.814 7). After further argument on 
that issue, the magistrate determined that she would rule on the 
issue after hearing the evidence (T.814 25-26). 
refused to present the gunshot residue tests. There was 
testimony that gunshot residue is transitory and can be wiped off 
quite easily (T. 578). The photographs of Susan Quas taken at 
the Quas residence depict a large blood spatter on her right arm 
(State Exhibit 43, Defense Exhibit 2), which spatter somehow 
disappeared prior to the autopsy, when the gunshot residue tests 
were performed (State's Exhibits 50-51). When presented with a 
photograph of the blood spatter taken at the Quas residence, Dr. 
Grey indicated that he did see the blood spatter on her right arm 
at the autopsy (T. 669), but did not explain what happened to the 
spatter prior to the taking of the autopsy photographs. While it 
might be inferred that the photographs of Susan's arms, unlike 
the photographs of her hands, were taken after Dr. Grey washed 
the body, such an assumption conflicts with Dr. Grey's comment 
when presenting the photographs of the arms indicating that the 
lack of blood on the arms in the photographs supports the theory 
that Susan was murdered (T. 665-666). 
13 
The second preliminary hearing was held on October 21, 
1988. The magistrate apparently adopted the most liberal 
approach to refiling of informations - one requiring some 
evidence in addition to that presented during the first 
preliminary hearing; she found that refiling the information was 
proper in this case because the State was cible to accumulate 
evidence additional to that presented at the first preliminary 
hearing (P.H.2 at 152). 
B. UNDER ARTICLE I SECTION 7 OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION, DUE 
PROCESS REQUIRES A SHOWING THAT THE EVIDENCE CAUSING A BINDOVER 
ORDER AT A SUCCESSIVE PRELIMINARY HEARING WAS NOT REASONABLY 
AVAILABLE AT A PRIOR PRELIMINARY HEARING. 
1. In Utah, Preliminary Hearings are Recognized as Important, and 
thus Governed by Strict Procedural Rules. 
In State v. Anderson, 612 P.2d 778 (Utah 1980), the 
Utah Supreme Court began its special recognition of the 
importance of preliminary hearings by extending the right to 
confrontation of witnesses to defendants during that critical 
stage of the prosecution. _Id. at 782-786, citing Article I 
section 12 of the Utah Constitution. In doing so, the Court 
noted the primary functions of preliminary hearings: relieving 
"the accused from the substantial degradation and expense 
incident to a modern criminal trial when the charges against him 
are unwarranted or the evidence insufficient", and promoting the 
defendant's right to a fair trial by providing the defendant with 
notice of the charges and discovery of the State's case against 
him. Ld. at 783-784. 
15 Appellant will refer to this hearing as P.H.2. 
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While the Anderson prosecution indicated that it would 
be inconvenient to present live testimony during the preliminary 
hearing, and while the statute governing preliminary hearings 
allowed for the presentation of hearsay evidence, the Court found 
that allowing the prosecution to base the probable cause showing 
on hearsay evidence would defeat the purposes of the preliminary 
hearing. Idl. at 781, 786. The court explained that if 
preliminary hearings are to serve their purposes in "weeding out 
improvident prosecutions", in giving the accused a meaningful 
opportunity to present an affirmative defense at the preliminary 
hearing, and in providing notice and discovery to the accused, 
the accused must be able to confront the witnesses against them. 
Id. at 786. 
2. In State v. Brickey, the Court Again Recognized the Importance 
of Procedural Precision in Preliminary Hearings. 
Continuing the tradition of special recognition of the 
importance of preliminary hearings in Utah, in State v. Brickey, 
714 P.2d 644 (Utah 1986), the court indicated that refiling an 
information after a dismissal based upon an inadequate showing of 
probable cause during the initial preliminary hearing was not a 
matter left to the discretion of the State. Ld. at 646-648. 
Working under the auspices of Article I section 7 of 
the Utah Constitution, the court began its analysis by noting the 
importance of preliminary hearings. The Court cited Anderson, 
supra, indicating that preliminary hearings protect the accused 
from groundless prosecutions, conserve judicial resources, and 
"promote... confidence in the judicial system." _Id. at 646. 
15 
The Court explained that unlimited refiling of 
informations dismissed for lack of probable cause would not be 
tolerated: 
For if this were the case, the State could 
easily harass defendants by refiling criminal 
charges which had previously been dismissed 
for insufficient evidence. Considerations of 
fundamental fairness preclude vesting the 
State with such unbridled discretion. See 
Jones v. State, 481 P.2d 169, 171 
(Okla.Crim.App. 1971); Stockwell v. State, 
98 Idaho 797, 573 P.2d 116, 138-39 (1977); 
People v. Walls, 117 Mich.App. 691, 324 
N.W.2d 136, 138 (1982). 
Id. at 647. 
The court expressly declined the State's invitation to 
rely on the good faith of prosecutors in refiling charges. Id. 
at 647. 
The problem presented in the facts before the Brickey 
court was forum shopping - the prosecutorial practice of refiling 
informations in successive courts in search of a favorable 
ruling, without the presentation of new or previously 
unavailable evidence or other good cause for refiling the 
information. _Id. at 647. Nonetheless, the standards set forth 
in Brickey and in the cases relied on by the Brickey court are 
applicable in cases such as the instant one where a successive 
preliminary hearing is conducted before the same magistrate: 
We find merit in the approach taken by 
the Oklahoma courts. In Jones v. State, 481 
P.2d 169 (Okla.Crim.App.1971), the Oklahoma 
Court of Criminal Appeals held that due 
process considerations prohibit a prosecutor 
from refiling criminal charges earlier 
dismissed for insufficient evidence unless 
the prosecutor can show that new or 
16 
previously unavailable evidence has surfaced 
or that other good cause justifies refiling. 
481 P.2d at 171. 
16 
Brickey at 647 (emphasis added). 
The language of the Brickey decision, calling for a 
showing that "new or previously unavailable evidence has 
surfaced" implies that the evidence presented at a successive 
preliminary hearing must have been unavailable at the prior 
preliminary hearing. As explained infra, the lesser standard of 
"any additional evidence" relied on by the magistrate in this 
case would encourage prosecutors to present the bare minimum of 
evidence at preliminary hearings, secure in the knowledge that an 
"innocent miscalculation" of sufficient evidence could be 
remedied by successive preliminary hearings. Given the interests 
at stake in preliminary hearings in Utah (stopping improvident 
16 The Court concluded that the prosecutor in Brickey had 
failed to present "new or previously unavailable evidence 
relating to the issue of consent" during the second preliminary 
hearing on the charge of forcible sexual abuse, and reversed the 
district court's order refusing to quash the bindover order. Id. 
at 647. 
At the second preliminary hearing in Brickey, the 
prosecutor presented evidence that on the day after the alleged 
forcible sexual assault, the appellant had paid the alleged 
victim $20 extra for babysitting and asked her out on a date. 
The alleged victim's father also testified at the second 
preliminary hearing that Appellant had admitted to "'making 
advances' toward the victim and touching her genital area and 
breasts." JEd. at 645. Although the prosecutor and the 
magistrate presiding over the second preliminary hearing both 
considered this evidence "new", the Supreme Court found that the 
evidence was not "new or previously unavailable". Id_. at 648. 
It is unclear whether the Court's basis for such a finding was 
that the new evidence presented was irrelevant to the issue of 
consent, or whether the new evidence was not previously 
unavailable. 
17 
prosecutions, giving defendants notice and discovery of the 
state's case, conserving judicial resources), the higher due 
process standard implied in Brickey and explained in the cases 
cited in Brickey must govern refiling informations in Utah. 
Jones v. State, 481 P.2d 169 (Okla.Crim.App. 1971), 
the case relied on repeatedly by the Brickey court, is a case 
involving forum shopping and failure to produce new evidence. 
Id* at 171. Key language in that decision should guide this 
Court in reversing the magistrate's ruling that successive 
preliminary hearings are justified by any kind of additional 
evidence. The court explained: 
If the State has sufficient evidence to bring 
an accused to trial, it should be prepared to 
offer such at one preliminary examination and 
not rely on bolstering its case at a 
subsequent preliminary examination, if 
necessary. It is dilatory to present 
evidence on an installment basis at different 
preliminaries. Let the State present its 
case at the preliminary and be done with it. 
If it is insufficient, then the prosecution 
is at an end unless new evidence becomes 
available or other good cause is shown. Not 
only is refiling without cause unnecessarily 
burdensome to our overcrowded courts, but it 
may constitute harassment of an 
accused....Additional or new evidence does 
not mean that which was known to the State at 
the time of the first preliminary or which 
could have been easily acquired. 
Id. at 171. 
The Jones court concluded that the* evidence presented 
at the second preliminary hearing was "substantially the same" as 
17 Pages 171 and 172 of the Jones decision are cited at page 
647 of the Brickey decision. 
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that presented at the previous hearing, and found no good cause 
to depart from the previous dismissal of the charge. Id_. at 172. 
Stockwell v. State, 573 P.2d 116 (Ida. 1977), another 
18 
case cited repeatedly by the Brickey court, involved a 
magistrate's refusal to allow the State to present additional 
evidence after the magistrate indicated the initial showing was 
inadequate. Ici. at 121. It is interesting to note that the Utah 
Supreme Court chose to cite a dissenting opinion in this case, 
that of Justice Bistline. At pages 138-139, Justice Bistline 
began by quoting the district judge in the case: 
"A person charged with Murder in 
the Second Degree is, in the words 
of the southern sheriff, 'in a heap 
of trouble.' Homicide, in any 
form, is very serious business. 
This Court, at least, believes a 
prosecuting attorney, presenting 
evidence at a preliminary hearing 
involving homicide in any degree 
must go into court with a fully 
loaded gun. He is under a duty to 
those he represents to present the 
best and most persuasive evidence 
he has. He may not withhold 
evidence in the vain hope the 
magistrate may guess or through 
Divinity or extra-sensory 
perception know what additional 
evidence the prosecutor may have 
available. In accordance with the 
law the magistrate must make his 
finding based upon substantial 
evidence; not upon speculation or 
conjecture." 
Justice Bistline continued: 
A prosecutor, of course, is not obliged to 
18 Pages 138-139 of the Stockwell opinion are cited by 
the Brickey court at page 647. 
19 
show his whole case at the preliminary 
hearing. Neither can he be coy and withhold 
evidence, in hope of later tactical 
advantage, if such evidence is necessary to 
convince the magistrate that a suspect should 
be bound over on the highest offense charged. 
See, Jones v. State, 481 P.2d 169 
(Okla.Crim.App.1971); Stone v. Hope, 488 P.2d 
616 (Okla.Crim.App. 197TT~. To allow a 
dismissal and refiling every time the 
prosecutor miscalculates the quantum of 
evidence needed to gain the desired 
commitment, ... 
"... would not only do violence to 
the due process rights of this 
Petitioner but would establish a 
very dangerous precedent which 
could adversely affect numerous 
other persons charged with crime. 
If the prosecutor could to this 
once, why not twice, ten times, or 
innumerable times? 
Id. at 138-139. 
Holmes v. District Court, 668 P.2d 11 (Colo. 1983), 
involved a prosecutor's decision to file an information directly 
with the district court (as allowed by statute) after a county 
court had dismissed the charges for lack of probable cause. Id. 
19 
at 13. At page 15, the following language appears: 
The affect of allowing a direct filing in a 
case where the district attorney states that 
he will offer direct rather than hearsay 
testimony would constitute approval of an 
undesirable practice of presenting as little 
evidence as possible at the preliminary 
hearing in the county court and then 
requesting the district court consent for a 
direct filing if no probable cause is found 
by the county court. This duplicative 
procedure unnecessarily taxes already 
strained judicial resources and subjects the 
accused to oppression and discrimination. 
19 Page 15 of the Holmes decision is cited by the Brickey 
court at page 647. 
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If the People may file a direct information 
in the district court simply because they 
made a tactical error at the preliminary 
hearing in the county court, there is little 
incentive to comply with the requirements 
governing preliminary hearings set forth in 
the Rules of Criminal Procedure and 
interpreted in the case law. 
(citations omitted). 
Given Utah's unique history of special recognition of 
the importance of preliminary hearings, and given the reasoning 
and language of the Brickey decision and the precedents cited 
therein, this Court should determine that a prosecutor may not 
refile an information unless he can justify the reversal of the 
initial dismissal order with evidence that was not reasonably 
available at the first preliminary hearing, or other good cause 
for refiling the information.^ 
20 It should be noted that this standard will not defeat 
the State's interest in prosecuting criminal cases. As the 
Brickey court explained in footnote 5, 
In Harper v. District Court, Okla., 484 
P. 2d 891 (1971), the Oklahoma court clarified 
Jones, holding that good cause to continue a 
preliminary hearing for further investigation 
might exist when a prosecutor innocently 
miscalculates the quantum of evidence 
required to obtain a bindover and further 
investigation clearly would not be dilatory. 
484 P.2d at 897. In addition, the Oklahoma 
Supreme Court has added a new Rule 6 to the 
Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals, 
permitting the state to appeal from an 
adverse ruling at a preliminary hearing. See 
State ex rel. Fallis v. Caldwell, 498 P.2d 
426, 428-29 (Okla.Crim.App.1972). 
Brickey at 647-648. 
A prosecutor who miscalculates the amount of evidence 
required to show probable cause can seek a continuance for 
further preparation (as v/as done once in this case, and as might 
have been done again after the magistrate indicated the 
deficiencies in the State's case, several days prior to the 
21 
C. THE MAGISTRATE IN THIS CASE VIOLATED APPELLANT'S RIGHTS TO 
DUE PROCESS IN ISSUING THE BINDOVER ORDER ON THE BASIS OF 
EVIDENCE PRESENTED AT THE SECOND PRELIMINARY HEARING THAT WAS 
READILY AVAILABLE TO THE PROSECUTION AT THE FIRST PRELIMINARY 
HEARING. 
In the instant case, the magistrate indicated prior to 
the second preliminary hearing that she would bind the case over 
if Mr. Matheson would present the gunshot residue test foundation 
and results that Mr. McConkie had previously refused to present 
upon the magistrate's request at the first preliminary hearing 
(T.814 2-5, 7). Given this assurance, the State proceeded to 
present evidence additional to the pivotal gunshot residue tests 
(which were available at the first preliminary hearing), not to 
secure a bindover order, but to insure that Appellant's 
conviction could withstand appellate review (T.814 6-7). See 
Appendix 1. 
It is doubtful that the Brickey court set forth the 
Utah due process standard for refiling dismissed cases with an 
eye to improving the appearance of appellate records. Rather, it 
seems that the court set forth the standard for refiling cases 
to force prosecutors to present their cases forthrightly the 
21 
first time at preliminary hearing. 
dismissal). 
In Utah also, a prosecutor faced with an improper 
dismissal for lack of probable cause can appeal the ruling. Utah 
Rule of Criminal Procedure 26(3)(a). See also R. 17, where the 
State concedes that extraordinary writs provide the State with 
relief from an improper dismissal. 
21 See Brickey at 714 P.2d at 647 (indicating that 
"fundamental fairness" requires judicial restraint of prosecutors 
in this context, because the good faith of prosecutors is "a 
22 
Given the misapplication of the Brickey standard in 
this case, perhaps this Court should refrain from engaging in 
Brickey analysis altogether. Nonetheless, Appellant provides 
that analysis infra* 
Inasmuch as the magistrate adopted a due process 
standard that permitted refiling of the information because the 
prosecution presented evidence in addition to that presented at 
the first preliminary hearing (P.H.2 152), the magistrate did not 
make findings indicating whether the State had presented any 
evidence during the second preliminary hearing that was not 
22 
reasonably available at the first preliminary hearing. 
Appellant maintains his position that the only evidence 
presented by the State during the second preliminary hearing that 
might have met the Brickey due process standard was the testimony 
of Kristine Knudson, who testified that after the first 
preliminary hearing, Appellant made statements to her concerning 
23 
the night of Susan's death (P.H.2 73-84). While the magistrate 
fragile protection for the accused."). 
22 A summary of the evidence presented at the first and 
second preliminary hearings was filed by the prosecution, and can 
be found at R. 18-30 and in Appendix 2 to this brief. While the 
summary is not completely accurate, it is adequate to give this 
Court a purview of the evidence presented at the preliminary 
hearings, and to show that, with the exception of the testimony 
of Kristine Knudson, all of the evidence presented at the second 
hearing was reasonably available at the first hearing. 
23 Ms. Knudson indicated, "He said he couldn't tell where 
she had gotten shot, and he said that he picked up her head and 
that there was blood coming out the back of her head. Then he 
said that he put a sheet under her." (P.H.2 75-76). She 
indicated that Appellant also told her that when he heard the 
shot and left the shower, he could tell Susan was already dead, 
23 
did indicate that the statements referred to by Ms. Knudson 
during the second preliminary hearing were "clearly inconsistent" 
with Appellant's statements to the investigating officers (P.H.2 
140), the magistrate did not indicate that this previously 
unavailable evidence was the reason for the bindover order in the 
second case* 
Because the magistrate at the first preliminary hearing 
indicated her disbelief of Appellant's statements to the 
investigating officers (P.H.l 169), it can hardly be assumed that 
this previously unavailable evidence from Ms. Knudson resulted in 
the bindover order. Rather, the bindover order was a result of 
the presentation of the previously available evidence presented 
at the second hearing, the gunshot residue tests. 
But as explained by the Brickey court, it was the 
State's burden to demonstrate with previously unavailable 
24 
evidence that the initial dismissal should not stand. 
Without meeting the Brickey standard (neither for 
purposes of appellate review, nor for purposes of fulfilling the 
and went downstairs to check the wash prior to calling for help 
(P.H.2 77). 
24 The Brickey court explained, 
The Jones court further held that when a 
charge is refiled, the prosecutor must, 
whenever possible, refile the charges before 
the same magistrate who does not consider 
that matter de novo, but looks at the facts 
to determine whether the new evidence or 
changed circumstances are sufficient to 
require a re-examination and possible 
reversal of the earlier decision dismissing 
the charges. I<3. at 171-72. 
714 P.2d at 647. 
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prosecutors' theoretical duties of following the law and seeing 
that justice is done), the State was allowed to refile the 
information after taking over one year to get its case 
25 
together. Meanwhile, as the transcript of the hearings and 
25 Indeed, the prolonged coalescence of the State's case 
seems to have had a veritably alchemic effect upon the State's 
evidence. 
Note how Appellant's gunshot residue test taken on the 
night of Susan's death asked for specification of debris on 
Appellant's hands, and Officer Edwards wrote "no [sic] clean but 
not dirty/fingernails dirty" (State's Exhibit 29). After the 
State determined to take issue with Appellant's statement that he 
was in the shower when the shot fired, at the first preliminary 
hearing, Officer Edwards indicated that Appellant's hands were 
dirty (P.H.I 32) that they were sweaty, and that there was grease 
on his right hand (P.H.I 49). At the first preliminary hearing, 
Appellant's hands were described by Officer Plotnick as dirty 
(P.H.I 11) and filmed with dirt as if he had been working in the 
yard (P.H.I 18). At the second preliminary hearing, Officer 
Spann testified that Appellant's hands were "extremely dirty" 
(P.H.2 20). At trial, Officer Plotnick described Appellant's 
hands as "soiled...with a film of dirt" (T. 307). At trial, 
Officer Spann indicated the hands were "extremely dirty" (T. 339) 
and "darkened on the tops and the bottoms" (T. 356). Officer 
Edwards indicated at trial that Appellant's hands were dirty (T. 
377). One can only wonder if a third preliminary hearing would 
have assisted the officers in recalling blood spatters on 
Appellant's hands. 
Officer Plotnick testified at trial on June 8, 1989 
that he recalled that on May 21 of 1987, Susan Quas had told him 
that one day he would come to the Quas residence to find that 
Appellant had murdered Susan (T. 285-286, 293). This statement 
apparently did not merit recording in the police report covering 
the incident (T. 296, 315), and apparently was not recalled in 
time for the first preliminary hearing, when Officer Plotnick 
testified (P.H.I 5-23), or during the second preliminary hearing. 
What might be characterized a coincidence in isolation 
becomes astounding when repeated. Officer Wright testified at 
trial on June 13, of 1989 that on May 16 of 1987 that Susan told 
him that Appellant was the guilty one, and that he'd kill Susan 
(T. 864). Once again, the statement did not merit recording in 
the police report (T. 867). 
While Susan Quas had blood spattered on her right arm 
when her body was photographed at the Quas residence, that blood 
spatter disappeared before the gunshot residue tests were 
performed on her (State Exhibit 43, Defense Exhibit 2; State's 
Exhibits 50-51). Given the repeated exaltations of police 
25 
procedures designed to preserve all evidence (e.g. P.H.2 29, T. 
322, 416), it is troubling that the blood spatter disappeared. 
At the first preliminary hearing, Officer Edwards 
indicated that the gun that shot Susan Quas had been analyzed and 
the expert checking for fingerprints indicated that it "might not 
have been wiped clean" (P.H.I 67-68). At the second preliminary 
hearing, Officer Edwards indicated that in his opinion, the gun 
had been wiped and there was a piece of red lint caught in 
between the barrel and extractor of the gun (P.H.2 34). At 
trial, Officer Edwards indicated that the gun had been wiped 
clean and was found with a "red piece of cloth" stuck near the 
extractor (T. 399). The red piece of lint, or cloth, 
unfortunately, was lost prior to analysis or presentation in 
evidence (T. 435). Then again, Officer Edwards was the 
investigating officer transporting the gun (T. 398-399), and 
perhaps he really did have personal knowledge that it had been 
wiped. 
Prior to trial, the State's evidence conformed to 
Officer Edwards1 testimony at the hearing on the motion to 
suppress Appellant's statements that until 6:15 a.m. on the 
morning following the death of Susan Quas, Appellant was free to 
leave police custody (P.H.I 38; M.H. 67-83). Officer Spann's 
testimony at trial was the first indication that while waiting at 
the Quas residence, Appellant was forced into his kitchen, and 
forced to remain and the table, forbidden even to get a drink or 
make a phone call (T. 243, 353, 260). Officer Spann prepared a 
taped report of the Quas investigation and submitted it to the 
department for transcription, but when he contacted Officer 
Edwards to get a copy of his report, the report could not be 
found (T. 343). 
Even in the middle of trial, the State's efforts to 
improve the evidence were unceasing. After the exclusionary rule 
had been invoked and the witnesses had been instructed to refrain 
from talking with one another, Officer Edwards, a witness in this 
case, with the acquiescence and in the presence of prosecutors 
MacDougall and Matheson, had a little conversation with defense 
witness, Mark Knudson, at the county attorney's office on the day 
before Mr. Knudson's testimony (T. 876-877). The County 
Attorneys and Police Officer Edwards were discussing Mr. 
Knudson's prior use of cocaine (T. 879). The court had already 
ruled that drug evidence was to be limited in use to 
demonstrating Susan Quas's state of mind on a specific occasion 
(T. 718), and that evidence had already been presented (T. 731). 
It appears that the prosecutors were satisfied with the covert 
effect of the little chat on Mr. Knudson's testimony, for they 
didn't feel the need during.Mr. Knudson's testimony at trial to 
use overtly the evidence concerning his cocaine use. The State's 
explanation to the trial court that Officer Edwards was the chief 
investigator in the case, and was used throughout the course of 
26 
trial in this case demonstrate, Appellant's ability to recall the 
relevant events deteriorated. 
Because the State failed to justify the reversal of the 
order of dismissal with previously unavailable evidence, or to 
show other good cause for the refiling of the information, 
Appellant is entitled to reversal of his conviction, and an order 
prohibiting further prosecution of this case unless the State can 
satisfy the demands of due process. 
II. 
THE DISTRICT COURT SHOULD HAVE EXERCISED 
ITS JURISDICTION TO QUASH THE MAGISTRATE'S 
DEFECTIVE BINDOVER ORDER. 
On November 16, 1988, Appellant submitted a motion in 
the district court, seeking quashal of the bindover and dismissal 
of the case, based on the prosecution's violation of Appellant's 
due process rights in refiling the information without meeting 
the Brickey standard (R. 261). After noting that the district 
courts obviously have more work to do than this Court, the 
district court ruled that it did not have jurisdiction over the 
26b 
motion (R. 327; M.H. 13-14). Appellant petitioned for an 
the trial to "help coordinate the witnesses" (T. 881) speaks for 
itself. 
26a Appellant testified that while he was married to Susan, 
he drank to the point of intoxication as often as six days a week 
(T. 804-806). Testimony from the State's witnesses confirmed 
that Appellant continued to drink during the year plus interim 
between the first and second preliminary hearings (T. 507-508, 
521). 
More than once, the prosecutor acknowledged Appellant's 
fogginess and inability to remember the events (M.H. 91, T. 839-
840) . 
26b The transcript containing all of the hearings on 
pretrial motions, stamped 813, will be referred to as M.H. 
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interlocutory appeal of this ruling of the district court, but 
27 the Utah Supreme Court denied the petition. 
A. THE DISTRICT COURT HAD UNLIMITED ORIGINAL JURISDICTION. 
The original jurisdiction of the district court is 
described in the Utah Constitution in Article VIII section 5, 
which reads as follows: 
The district court shall have original 
jurisdiction in all matters except as limited 
by this constitution or by statute, and power 
to issue all extraordinary writs. The 
district court shall have appellate 
jurisdiction as provided by statute. The 
jurisdiction of all other courts, both 
original and appellate, shall be provided by 
statute. Except for matters filed originally 
with the supreme court, there shall be in all 
cases an appeal of right from the court of 
original jurisdiction to a court with 
appellate jurisdiction over the cause. 
By statute, the district court had plenary original 
. ,. . 28 jurisdiction. 
27 The petition for interlocutory appeal and the denial 
thereof were supplemented to the appellate record and filed with 
this Court on March 1, 1990. 
28 Utah Code Ann. section 78-3-4 provides: 
(1) The district court has original 
jurisdiction in all matters civil and 
criminal, not excepted in the Utah 
Constitution and not prohibited by law. 
(2) The district court judges may issue 
all extraordinary writs and other writs 
necessary to carry into effect their orders, 
judgments, and decrees. 
(3) Under the general supervision of the 
presiding officer of the Judicial Council, 
cases filed in the district court, which are 
also within the concurrent jurisdiction of 
the circuit court, may be transferred to the 
circuit court by the presiding judge of the 
district court in multiple judge districts, 
or the district court judge in single judge 
districts. The transfer of these cases may 
be made upon the court's own motion or upon 
28 
B. ACCORDING TO UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 10 AND 12, THE 
DISTRICT COURT SHOULD HAVE DISPOSED OF THE MOTION TO QUASH THE 
BINDOVER ORDER DURING THE COURT'S EXERCISE OF ORIGINAL 
JURISDICTION* 
Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 12(b)(1) indicates 
that the insufficiency of evidence to support the bindover order 
must be raised in the trial court. It provides, in part: 
The following shall be raised at least five 
days prior to trial: 
(1) defenses and objections 
based on defects in the indictment 
or information other than that it 
fails to show jurisdiction in the 
court or to charge an offense, 
which objection shall be noticed by 
the court at any time during the 
proceedingC.] 
The fact that this provision encompasses motions to quash 
bindovers and dismiss informations based upon inadequate 
showings of probable cause is demonstrated by Rule of Criminal 
Procedure 7, which indicates that the information is subject to 
dismissal by the magistrate if it is not supported by evidence 
meeting the probable cause standard. Cf. e.g. State v. Smith, 
the motion of either party for adjudication. 
When an order is made transferring a case, 
the court shall transmit the pleadings and 
papers to the circuit court to which the case 
is transferred. The circuit court has the 
same jurisdiction as if the case had been 
originally commenced in the circuit court and 
any appeals from final judgments shall be to 
the Court of Appeals. 
(4) Appeals from the final orders, 
judgments, and decrees of the district court 
are under Sections 78-2-2 and 78-2a-3. 
(5) The district court has jurisdiction 
to review agency adjudicative proceedings as 
set forth in Chapter 46b, Title 63, and shall 
comply with the requirements of that chapter, 
in its review of agency adjudicative 
proceedings. 
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617 P.2d 232 (Okl.Cr. 1980)(affirming district court's "order 
quashing the information" based on insufficient evidence 
presented at preliminary hearing). 
Even if Rule 12 were not read as granting the district 
courts jurisdiction over motions to quash bindovers and dismiss 
informations, Rule 10 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure 
contemplates that the district court dispose of all objections 
relating to the preliminary hearing during the exercise of the 
court's original jurisdiction. That rule states, in part, 
(a) Upon the return of an indictment or 
upon receipt of the records from the 
magistrate following a bindover, the 
defendant shall forthwith be arraigned in 
the district court. Arraignment shall be 
conducted in open court and shall consist of 
reading the indictment or information to the 
defendant or stating to him the substance of 
the charge and calling on him to plead 
thereto. He shall be given a copy of the 
indictment or information before he is called 
upon to plead. 
(b) If upon arraignment the defendant 
requests additional time in which to plead or 
otherwise respond, a reasonable time may be 
granted. 
(c) Any defect or irregularity in or 
want or absence of any proceeding provided 
for by statute or these rules prior to 
arraignment shall be specifically and 
expressly objected to before a plea of guilty 
is entered or the same is waived. 
Both Rule 10 and Rule 12 of the Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure evidence legislative intent for district court 
disposition of objections to inadequate showings of probable 
cause at preliminary hearings. 
C. WHETHER CHARACTERIZED AS ORIGINAL OR APPELLATE JURISDICTION, 
DISTRICT COURTS HAVE JURISDICTION TO QUASH BINDOVERS AND DISMISS 
INFORMATIONS. 
While it appears that Rules 10 and 12 contemplate that 
30 
district courts will dispose of motions to quash bindover orders 
and to dismiss informations during the exercise of original 
jurisdiction, even if the disposition of such motions were 
considered an appellate function, district courts may perform the 
function. 
The district court in the instant case apparently 
viewed the disposition of motions to quash bindovers and dismiss 
informations as the exercise of appellate jurisdiction over 
circuit courts (M.H. 13-14), which by statute is part of this 
29 
Court's jurisdiction. This view was erroneous. 
As explained in Van Dam v. Morris, 571 P.2d 1325 (Utah 
1977), when a preliminary hearing is conducted, the presiding 
magistrate acts under the unique jurisdiction attaching to the 
role of magistrate. In the Van Dam case, the court was 
discussing the impropriety of a city court dismissal of a class A 
29 Utah Code Ann. section 78-2a-3(2)(c) reads: 
« . . . 
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate 
jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of 
interlocutory appeals, over: 
.... 
(d) appeals from the circuit courts, 
except those from the small claims department 
of a circuit court[.] 
Utah Code Ann. section 78-4-11 provides: 
Except as otherwise directed by section 
78-2-2, appeals from final civil and criminal 
judgments of the circuit courts are to the 
Court of Appeals. The county attorney shall 
represent the interest of the state as 
public prosecutor in any criminal appeals 
from the circuit court. City attorneys shall 
represent the interests of municipalities in 
any appeals from circuit courts involving 
violations of municipal ordinances. 
(emphasis added). 
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Misdemeanor case under the statutory scheme operant at that time. 
The court explained, 
A preliminary examination does not 
invoke the jurisdiction of the court. In 
such a proceeding, the action is not action 
by a judge of any court, but that of a 
magistrate, a distinct statutory office. 
Justices of the Supreme Court, district 
judges, city court judges, and justices of 
the peace, when sitting as magistrates having 
the jurisdiction and powers conferred by law 
upon magistrates and not those that pertain 
to their respective judicial offices. 
Id. at 1327. 
Regardless of which judge or justice sits as magistrate 
over a preliminary hearing, it appears that the district court is 
expected by the legislature to review the conduct and/or findings 
of the magistrate when faced with an objection. If this Court 
wishes to characterize this review as "appellate", then Utah 
Rules of Criminal Procedure 10 and 12 provide the statutory 
authorization of district court exercise of this "appellate" 
30 jurisdiction. 
This Court should inform the district courts that they 
have jurisdiction to quash a magistrate's improper bindover 
order, and should exercise this jurisdiction in order to prevent 
the tremendous waste of judicial resources that occurs when 
improper bindover orders are not stricken at the soonest 
opportunity. 
30 Article VIII section 5 of the Utah Constitution 
indicates that the appellate jurisdiction of the district courts 
is "as provided by statute". 
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III. 
THE TRIAL COURT VIOLATED 
UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE 702, 404, AND 403, 
AND APPELLANT'S RIGHT TO A JURY TRIAL 
BY ADMITTING UNFOUNDED EXPERT TESTIMONY 
ON THE FAILURE OF SUSAN QUAS'S BEHAVIOR 
TO COMPORT WITH STATISTICAL NORMS OF SUICIDE. 
Perhaps the most consistently defended position of the 
State's witnesses and prosecutors was that Susan Quas did not 
commit suicide because no one commits suicide by holding the gun 
3 
inches away from themselves and shooting themselves in the eye. 
Brent Marchant of the State Medical Examiner's Office 
and University of Utah Police Officer, testified that he had 
worked at the Medical Examiner's Officer for ten years, and that 
he had participated in many of the investigations of the one 
hundred and fifty gunshot suicides that occur in Utah each year 
(T. 475, 477-478). He said that in his experience, Susan Quas's 
wound was unusual because he'd seen only one case of suicide in 
which the victim had shot herself in the eye (T. 480). He 
indicated that that shooting involved an elderly blind woman who 
had zipped herself inside a sleeping bag, and placed the gun 
directly against her eye and shot (T. 480-481). 
Dr. Grey, the Assistant Medical Examiner, testified 
that he had seen about four hundred and fifty gunshot homicides 
31 While Appellant did not object to this evidence at 
trial, this Court should evaluate this issue because, as is 
demonstrated infra, the trial court in this instance committed 
plain error. See State v. Braun, 128 Utah Adv.Rep 45, 47-49 
(Utah App. 1990)(this Court has the discretion to address errors 
for the first time on appeal when those errors are both plain and 
harmful, and will exercise this discretion more liberally to see 
that justice is done when more harmful errors occur). 
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and between four hundred and fifty and five hundred gunshot 
suicides (T. 652). After explaining that it was possible for 
Susan to have shot herself, he indicated 
[B]ut it's a very cumbersome and in my 
experience completely atypical way for 
somebody to commit suicide. When people 
shoot themselves, they usually put the gun 
where they want the bullet to go and pull the 
trigger. I've never seen a clearly proven 
suicide where the person has held the gun as 
far as away from their body as they possibly 
can before shooting. 
(T. 683). Dr. Grey explained that he had seen one case of 
suicide involving a gunshot wound to the eye - a case of Russian 
Roulette (T. 688). He concluded "I have no doubt that somebody 
shot Susan." (T. 690). 
This evidence was the first the prosecutor chose to 
focus on in opening argument (T. 184-185). 
As the first "brick" in the prosecution's "wall" of 
closing argument, the prosecutor pointed to norms of suicide and 
Susan's failure to meet those norms. 
For example, you have heard from 
witnesses who have examined hundreds of 
gunshot suicide wounds, and not one has seen 
any self-inflicted wounds like this one. Why 
would this woman, even if she were suicidal, 
shoot herself in the face, in the eye, from a 
distance with outstretched arms? It violates 
everything you've been presented with in 
terms of human experience and human nature. 
In the collective experience of 
Detective Edwards, Brent Marchant, and Dr. 
Grey and others 3 2 points to homicide on this 
score alone. 
32 Appellate counsel is unable to find testimony on this 
issue from witnesses other than Mr. Marchant and Dr. Grey. 
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(T. 890). In the middle of his closing argument, the prosecutor 
revisited this "brick": 
This wasn't a contact wound. It was not 
a near contact wound. Indeed, the distance 
firing test and Dr. Grey's analysis showed 
that the gun was approximately 16 to 18 
inches away from Susan Quas' eye when the gun 
was fired, give or take two to four inches. 
Detective Edwards, Brent Marchant, Dr. Grey 
have all witnessed hundreds of suicides by 
gunshot wounds, and they told you the gunshot 
victims almost never shoot themselves in the 
eye. Indeed, the only exception that we've 
heard about to prove the rule, one was a 
Russian Roulette contact wound recorded by 
Dr. Grey, and the other was a blind woman 
inside a sleeping bag, contact wound reported 
by Brent Marchaiit. Both of these were 
contact wounds.33 
The collective experience of witnessing 
hundreds of gunshot suicides is that never 
had any of them seen suicide victims who shot 
themselves in the eye from a distance. 
(T. 907-908). 
As the last drop in the State's "tidal wave" of 
rebuttal closing argument, the prosecutor again emphasized this 
evidence: 
There was Mr. Gaskill's opinion that it 
was highly unlikely that Susan fired the gun, 
the opinion of an experienced criminalist; 
Dr. Grey's opinion of an experienced 
criminalist; Dr. Grey's opinion that the 
manner of death was homicide, the opinions of 
an experienced pathologist who's examined 
hundreds of gunshot suicides and homicides 
and whose job it is — this is his job to 
determine — the manner of death; an opinion 
he holds without a doubt; an opinion he holds 
with as much as or more certainty than you 
need to have. And a combination of opinions 
33 Dr. Grey indicated that the Russian Roulette victim's 
wound was a near contact wound, that the gun was right by the eye 
(T. 709). 
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from a leading criminalist and the State's 
Medical Examiner, that Susan Quas didn't fire 
the weapon. 
(T. 945-946)(emphasis added). 
While the State witnesses and prosecutors apparently 
were satisfied to rely on this probabilities evidence, and while 
the prosecutor represented that this assumption was already 
proven beyond a reasonable doubt (see emphasized language 
above), the Utah Supreme Court had already decided that such 
evidence is not an accurate mode of proof of a person's behavior 
when that behavior is at issue in the case. State v. Rammel, 721 
P.2d 498, 501 (Utah 1986). 
In Rammel, a witness named Dyson testified under a 
grant of immunity to his and the Appellant's involvement in a 
robbery. _Id. at 499. When initially confronted about the crime, 
Dyson denied any knowledge about or participation in the robbery, 
but later confessed. E^d. at 499. The trial court admitted the 
testimony of an Officer Welti, which indicated that most people 
who eventually confess to the commission of crimes initially lie 
to police officers about the crimes. 3x1. at 500. Apparently, 
the prosecution was attempting to show with this evidence that 
Dyson's initial denial of involvement of the crime was normal, 
and supported the credibility of his later confession. _Id. at 
500. 
After discussing the impropriety of admitting this 
testimony under evidentiary rules relating to impeachment of 
witnesses and foundation for expert testimony, the court 
36 
explained that the prosecution should not ask jurors to base 
their conclusions in a specific case on evidence of probabilities 
based on what happened in other cases, but should encourage 
jurors to focus on the evidence pertinent to the specific case 
before them. The court stated: 
Finally, even if the testimony was 
proper impeachment evidence, it should have 
been excluded because its potential for 
prejudice substantially outweighed its 
probative value. In this case, the 
prosecution attempted to establish, in 
effect, that there was a high statistical 
probability that Dyson lied. Even where 
statistically valid probability evidence has 
been presented - and Welti's testimony hardly 
qualifies as such - courts have routinely 
excluded it when the evidence invites the 
jury to focus upon a seemingly scientific, 
numerical conclusion rather than to analyze 
the evidence before it and decide where truth 
lies. Probabilities cannot conclusively 
establish that a single event did or did not 
occur and are particularly inappropriate when 
used to establish facts "not susceptible to 
quantitative analysis," such as whether a 
particular individual is telling the truth at 
any given time. 
Id. at 501 (citations omitted). 
Utah Rule of Evidence 702 allows for expert testimony 
34 
only when a witness is properly qualified. Neither Mr. 
Marchant nor Dr. Grey was qualified to render an expert opinion 
34 The rule provides: 
If scientific, technical, or other 
specialized knowledge will assist the trier 
of fact to understand the evidence or to 
determine a fact in issue, a witness 
qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, 
experience, training, or education, may 
testify thereto in the form of an opinion or 
otherwise. 
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on statistical normal modes of committing suicide because they 
were only exposed to those suicide attempts that succeeded. 
There is no way to know how many people have held a gun inches 
away from themselves and pulled the trigger because of the 
inaccuracies inherent in such a mode. These witnesses were 
further removed from qualification to rend€*r statistical analysis 
in this case because the variables involved in this case (a blood 
alcohol level of .30, a person in the habit of feigning suicide 
attempts, a person in the habit of handling guns) most likely 
were neither present nor monitored in the other cases. 
Even if Dr. Grey and Mr. Marchant were qualified to 
render an expert opinion on Susan's conduct based on 
probabilities gleaned from statistical analysis of the behavior 
of other people, such evidence is inadmissible. In those limited 
circumstances when character evidence is admissible to prove a 
person's conduct on a specific occasion, the character evidence 
must focus on the person whose conduct is in dispute. In the 
instant case, the prosecution was allowed to inform the jurors 
that Susan Quas's conduct on the night of her death could be 
deduced from the character, or traditional past conduct, of other 
people. See Utah Rule of Evidence 404. 
35 If the trial court had taken the time to exercise its 
jurisdiction over the motion to quash the bindover, the court 
might have read the magistrate's concerns to this effect (P.H.I 
115-116). 
36 The rule provides: 
Rule 404. Character evidence not 
admissible to prove conduct; exceptions? 
other crimes. 
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In allowing the jurors to be distracted from their duty 
of focusing on the evidence in this case with evidence of other 
cases, the court violated Rule of Evidence 403. Rammel at 501, 
supra. In allowing the prosecutor to go a step further and 
assure the jurors that the experts had already reached 
professional opinions of Appellant's guilt, which expert opinions 
were at least as accurate as the reasonable doubt standard of 
proof, the court violated Appellant's right to a jury trial. 
Utah Constitution, Article I sections 10 and 12. 
(a) Character evidence generally. 
Evidence of a person's character or a trait 
of his character is not admissible for the 
purpose of proving that he acted in 
conformity therewith on a particular 
occasion, except: 
(1) Character of accused. 
Evidence of a pertinent trait of 
his character offered by an 
accused, or by the prosecution to 
rebut the same; 
(2) Character of victim. 
Evidence of a pertinent trait of 
character of the victim of the 
crime offered by an accused, or by 
the prosecution to rebut the same, 
or evidence of a character trait of 
peacefulness of the victim offered 
by the prosecution in a homicide 
case to rebut evidence that the 
victim was the first aggressor; 
(3) Character of witness. 
Evidence of the character of a 
witness, as provided in Rules 607, 
608, and 609. 
(b) Evidence of other crimes, wrongs or 
acts is not admissible to prove the character 
of a person in order to show that he acted in 
conformity therewith. It may, however, be 
admissible for other purposes, such as proof 
of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, 
plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of 
mistake or accident. 
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Given the facts that Susan Quas' s behavior v/as 
extraordinary when she drank, and that on the night of her death 
she had consumed enough alcohol to reach a blood alcohol level of 
.30, the possibilities that she might have committed suicide in 
an unusual manner or had an accident are troubling, and certainly 
could have formed reasonable doubts in the minds of the jurors. 
Appellant is therefore entitled to reversal of his conviction. 
IV. 
THE TRIAL COURT VIOLATED APPELLANT'S 
RIGHTS AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION 
IN ALLOWING INCRIMINATING STATEMENTS OF APPELLANT 
INTO EVIDENCE ABSENT PROPER SHOWINGS BY THE STATE. 
A. NUMEROUS STATEMENTS OF APPELLANT WERE ADMITTED THROUGH THE 
TESTIMONY OF POLICE OFFICERS. 
During the State's case in chief, the State presented 
numerous statements of Appellant made in his home to several 
police officers, and made to Officer Edwards at the West Valley 
Police Department. The statements made at Appellant's home were 
to the effect that Appellant said that when the gun went off, he 
was in the shower, and were relayed through Officers Cox, 
Plotnick, Spann, and Edwards (T. 241; 287-288, 305; 338; 375-
37 
376). Officers Spann and Edwards also indicated that Appellant 
said that the gunshot residue test might not be accurate because 
37 The statement was incriminating because the officers 
testified that Appellant did not appear to have showered (T. 339-
340), because the shower was dry (T. 289), and because the water 
heater was turned off (T. 383). 
State's exhibits 2 and 3, tapes of Appellant's calls to 
911 and to the police also contain statements to the effect that 
Appellant was in the shower when the shot fired, but the tapes 
reflect the emotional distress and confusion that Appellant was 
suffering at the time. 
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Appellant had been fertilizing the lawn that day (T. 344; 391-
% 38 392). Appellant apparently told Officer Spann that he was 
washing some clothes to take on a trip.39 The statements made to 
Officer Edwards at the West Valley Police Department were to the 
effect that Appellant said that he had been in the shower for 
four or five minutes, was half shaved, and had washed his hair 
when the gun went off, and that prior to the shooting, he had put 
the pants and some shirts to his suit into the washer (T. 375-
40 378; 453-460, 474). Officer Edwards was also allowed to 
testify that when he asked Appellant how the sheets came to be 
41 
underneath Mrs. Quas, Appellant refused to answer (T. 411). 
B. PRIOR TO ADMITTING THE STATEMENTS OF APPELLANT, IT WAS THE 
STATE'S DUTY TO ESTABLISH APPELLANT'S KNOWING AND INTELLIGENT 
WAIVER OF HIS RIGHTS PRIOR TO MAKING THE STATEMENTS. 
In Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), the Court 
established that prior to submitting exculpatory or inculpatory 
statements of the accused which stem from custodial 
38 The statement was incriminating because the pellet 
fertilizer and fertilizer spreader at the Quas home did not 
appear to have been used (T. 344), and because the lawn at the 
Quas residence did not appear to have been fertilized with 
pellets (T. 618-619). 
39 The statement was incriminating because the washer 
contained mostly towels (T. 386). 
40 Defense Exhibit 1 is apparently the transcript of the 
taped interview with Officer Edwards, pertinent pages of which 
are included in Appendix 3. 
These statements were incriminating because Appellant's 
appearance did not match the described activities, and because 
the washer contained primarily towels and leisure wear (T. 386). 
41 See Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 (1976)(use of post-
arrest silence is a violation of rights against self-
incrimination) . 
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interrogation or interrogation occurring when the accused is 
deprived of his freedom in any significant way, the State bears 
the burden of proving that prior to making the statements, the 
accused was given his "Miranda" warnings, and made a voluntary, 
knowing and intelligent waiver of his rights. 384 U.S. 436, 444-
445. The Court explained the difficult burden the state bears in 
asserting waiver of rights, and why the burden for admissibility 
is on the state: 
If the interrogation continues without 
the presence of an attorney and a statement 
is taken, a heavy burden rests on the 
government to demonstrate that the defendant 
knowingly and intelligently waived his 
privilege against self-incrimination and his 
right to retained or appointed counsel. This 
Court has always set high standards of proof 
for the waiver of constitutional rights, and 
we re-assert these standards as applied to 
in-custody interrogation. Since the State is 
responsible for establishing the isolated 
circumstances under which the interrogation 
takes place and has the only means of making 
available corroborated evidence of warnings 
given during incommunicado interrogation, the 
burden is rightly on its shoulders. 
43 
Id. at 475 (citations omitted). 
42 "Prior to any questioning, the person must be warned 
that he has a right to remain silent, that any statement he does 
make may be used as evidence against him, and that he has a right 
to the presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed." 
384 U.S. 436, 444. 
43 See also 384 U.S. 436 at 479, "But unless and until 
such warnings and waiver are demonstrated by the prosecution at 
trial, no evidence obtained as a result of interrogation can be 
used against him."; State v. Shuman, 639 P.2d 155, 157 (Utah 
1981)("Under Miranda, a person in custody must be informed of his 
right to remain silent prior to interrogation. That warning is a 
prerequisite to the admissibility of any statement made by a 
defendant during custodial interrogation."); State v. Lopez, 451 
P.2d 772, 775 (Utah 1969)("[W]here there is in-custody 
41 
In State v. Crank, 142 P.2d 178 (Utah 1943), the Utah 
Supreme Court discussed in dicta the order of proof involved in 
the presentation of custodial statements under Article I section 
12 of the Utah Constitution: 
When the state seeks to put the confession 
before the jury it must establish its 
competency to the court. To do this it must 
show that the confession was given by the 
accused as his voluntary act; as an 
expression of his independent and free will, 
uninfluenced by fear of punishment or by hope 
of reward; that it was not induced or 
influence...In laying a foundation for 
offering the writing, if a written 
confession, or the conversation, if an oral 
confession, the state will of course be 
required to show the time and place of the 
conversation, or the writing and signing of 
the instrument and also what is generally 
called a prima facie showing that it was the 
free and voluntary act of the accused. Then 
when the conversation or writing is offered, 
is the time for the accused to make objection 
to its competency. When such objection is 
made, the court will hear all the evidence 
pertaining to that question and itself 
determine its voluntariness as a matter of 
law - that is, the competency of the offered 
evidence. 
Lead opinion of Justice Larson, joined by Justice Moffat at 185. 
Justices Wade, McDonnough, and Wolfe, again in dicta, 
preferred the following rule: 
(5) A modern English ruling takes a middle 
path, and seems to receive the confession 
unless attacked by evidence of an improper 
inducement and then in case of doubt leaves 
upon the prosecution the burden of convincing 
the court of the admissibility. 
questioning by police officers, the prosecution has the burden of 
showing that an accused knowingly and intelligently waived his 
privilege in that regard."). 
42 
Id. at 196. 
As this case so amply demonstrates, it is the State who 
is in the best position to know the facts surrounding custodial 
44 
statements, and under Article I section 12 of the Utah 
Constitution, the rule and reasoning of Justices Larson and 
Moffat should be formally adopted by this Court. Prior to 
presenting custodial statements of defendants to jurors, the 
State must present them to the court, along with a prima facia 
showing of voluntariness. 
Even if this Court were to adopt the more liberal 
procedure of Justices Wolfe, McDonnough, and Wade, all 
44 Appellant was under emotional distress and had been 
drinking on the night of his wife's death (T. 251-252, 377). His 
testimony at the hearing on the motion to suppress his statements 
concerning that night was understandably vague and incomplete 
(M.H. 48-66). 
At the first preliminary hearing, the State provided 
the testimony of Officer Edwards concerning the nature of 
Appellant's custody. When asked, "[H]ad Mr. Quas been placed 
under arrest any time prior to [being taken to the police 
department]?", Officer Edwards forthrightly explained, 
At that time, I asked Mr. Quas who he wanted 
to call. He said, call Russell Wagner, W-a-
g-n-e-r. I asked him how he spelled the 
name. After he spelled it, I looked in the 
phone book on my desk. I pulled it out. On 
a yellow piece of paper I wrote the name, the 
address, and the phone number. 
(P.H.I 38). 
At the hearing on the motion to suppress, Officer 
Edwards maintained his position that Appellant was free to do as 
he pleased and was not in custody until 6:15 the morning after 
Susan's death, when he was arrested (M.H. 67-83). 
It was not until trial that the State revealed that on 
the night of Susan's death, Appellant was forced into the kitchen 
by two officers, forced to remain seated there, and not allowed 
even to get a drink or make a phone call during the two hours 
prior to his transport to the police department (T. 243, 353, 
360). The police report written by the officer making these 
admissions at trial, according to Officer Edwards, was lost (T. 343). 
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statements taken from Appellant were challenged by Appellant's 
45 
motion in limine, and it was the State's burden to demonstrate 
the admissibility of the statements. 
C. APPELLANT WAS A HOMICIDE SUSPECT AND SUBJECTED TO CUSTODIAL 
INTERROGATION AT HIS HOME AND AT THE POLICE DEPARTMENT. 
In Salt Lake City v. Carner, 664 P.2d 1168 (Utah 1983), 
the court explained that during investigation, a police officer 
is not obligated to give Miranda warnings to everyone 
questioned; rather, it is when the investigation becomes 
custodial or accusatory that the Miranda warnings must be given. 
Id. at 1170. The Court listed four factors to be considered in 
determining whether the interrogation is investigatory or 
accusatory: 
(1) the site of interrogation; (2) whether 
the investigation focused on the accused; (3) 
whether the objective indicia of arrest were 
present; and (4) the length and form of 
interrogation. 
Id. at 1171, quoting State v. Riffle, 638 P.2d 732 (Ariz. 1981). 
Although Carner discussed various federal precedents, the 
opinion is based on Article I section 12 of the Utah 
45 On May 15, 1989, Appellant submitted a motion to 
suppress "any and all statements by the defendant, and fruits of 
any such statements, made in violation of the defendant's rights 
under the Fifth and Sixth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution, 
Article I, Section 12 of the Utah Constitution, and Miranda v. 
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966)." (R. 412). 
The court denied the motion on May 24, 1989, finding 
that Appellant was not in custody when the statements were taken 
(R. 446-447). A copy of the court's findings is attached as 
Appendix 4. 
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Constitution. Id. at 1272. 
The court explained that an investigating officer must 
determine if a crime occurred and who committed it# and found 
that the interrogation present in the earner case occurred prior 
to the officer's ascertainment that a crime had been committed, 
and was therefore investigatory, rather than accusatory. icU at 
1172. 
Review of the facts finally presented at trial 
demonstrates that Appellant was both suspected of homicide and 
deprived of his freedom of action at his home and at the police 
station. There was no question in the minds of the police 
officers that a crime had been committed, and no question in 
their minds that Appellant had committed it. 
1. Appellant was suspected of homicide and subjected to custodial 
interrogation at the Quas residence. 
On their way into the Quas residence, the police 
officers noticed a purse, a mug, and a cigarette lighter on the 
front porch (T. 237, 286-287, 348-349). This made the officers 
46 At trial, the prosecutor indicated that Appellant's 
reliance on Carner was misplaced because earner was supposedly 
superseded by federal case law focusing on custody and abandoning 
the inquiry concerning whether the person subject to 
interrogation is a suspect (R. 439-445; M.H. 88). The trial 
court apparently followed the prosecutor, basing its denial of 
the motion to suppress solely on the absence of custodial 
interrogation. See Appendix 4. 
This reasoning flies in the face of perhaps one of the 
most basic concepts of federalism - federal court interpretations 
of the federal constitution may be persuasive authority, but do 
not govern or supersede state court interpretations of state 
constitutions. E.g. Sandy City v. Larson, 733 P.2d 137, 141-144 
(Utah 1987)(concurring and dissenting opinions of Justices Durham 
and Zimmerman). 
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suspicious/ and was apparently the basis of Officer Spann's 
directive to treat the case as a homicide (T. 348-349). At the 
first preliminary hearing, Officer Plotnick indicated that the 
absence of blood spatter and appropriate powder burns on the body 
of Mrs. Quas led him and Officer Spann to believe the case was a 
homicide (P.H.I 15). Officer Edwards also testified that his 
examination of Mrs. Quas led him to the conclusion that Mrs. Quas 
had been killed (P.H.I 41; T. 404-412). All of the investigating 
officers viewed the body of Mrs. Quas prior to speaking with 
Appellant (T. 238-239; 299-301; 337; 374). 
On the night of Susan Quas's death, Officer Cox was the 
first officer to arrive at 9:43 p.m., and Officer Plotnick 
arrived two minutes later (T. 235-237, 240). According to 
Officer Cox, it was a couple of minutes after Officer Cox arrived 
that Appellant told him that he was in the shower when the shot 
fired (T. 241). Officer Plotnick indicated that it was a couple 
of minutes after he arrived when the statement concerning the 
shower was made to Officer Cox (T. 305). At the time the 
statement was made, Appellant was standing near Susan's corpse, 
47 None of the statements were placed in context to 
determine whether the statements were spontaneous or in response 
to questions (T. 287). Officer Edwards was unable to separate 
which statements were made to him at the Quas residence, which 
statements were made at the police station prior to the 
activation of the tape recorder, and which statements were made 
at the police station on tape (T. 454-461, 471-472). 
This might be explained by the two year passage of time 
between Susan's death and Appellant's trial. 
As noted supra, the vagueness of the record is the 
State's responsibility; it was the State's burden to prove the 
statements admissible. 
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and between Officers Cox and Plotnick (P.H.I 20-21). 
Officer Spann arrived at the Quas residence at 9:48 (T. 
333-335). When he arrived, he looked at Mrs. Quas and discussed 
the suspicious nature of the scene first with Officer Plotnick 
and then with Officer Cox, and they determined to treat the case 
as a homicide and to consult with homicide detective Edwards (T. 
348, 349). 
Officer Spann met Appellant at 9:51 or 9:53 (T. 337). 
Ke indicated that it was at that time that Appellant made the 
statements concerning the shower (T. 338). Officer Spann and 
Officer Cox moved Appellant into the kitchen (T. 350). This was 
not easy because he was emotionally distraught; it took them tv/o 
or three minutes (T. 353). Officer Cox stayed with Appellant at 
the kitchen table (T. 353). 
Appellant was at the kitchen table and interviewed 
while there were at least four officers present in the Quas 
residence (T. 241, 305, 338, 375). When asked if Appellant was 
cooperative, Officer Spann noted that Appellant was so obdurate 
as to try several times to get up from the kitchen table to make 
a phone call and to get a drink (T. 360). He was forced to stay 
at the kitchen table with Officer Cox for about an hour and a 
half to two hours (T. 243). 
Homicide detective Edwards was called to the Quas 
residence to investigate a homicide at 9:50 or 9:55, and he 
arrived at about 10:15 p.m. (T. 365-366; 442). After he was 
informed by Officer Spann and Plotnick of the suspicious 
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circumstances, and after he examined the body of Mrs. Quas, he 
went into the kitchen and interviewed Appellant and administered 
a gunshot residue test on Appellant (T. 372-374, 387). He then 
had Appellant sign a form consenting to the search of the Quas 
residence (P.H.I 63-64). 
Officer Edwards indicated that before he even walked in 
the Quas residence, he suspected Appellant of homicide (T. 443). 
When asked if Appellant was under arrest at the Quas 
home, Officer Edwards indicated he was not, and indicated that if 
Appellant had wanted to leave, Officer Edwards "imagined" the 
officers would have let him go (M.H. 68). 
The police had seized Appellant's car keys and placed 
them into evidence (M.H. 80). 
2. Appellant was suspected of homicide and subjected to 
custodial interrogation at the police station. 
Officer Edwards indicated that two hours after the 
police arrived at the Quas residence, Officer Cox came to Officer 
Edwards at the Quas residence, relaying Appellant's request for 
permission to leave (M.H. 68). Officer Edwards suggested that 
Officer Cox ask Appellant "if he wants to go down to the P.D. or 
somewhere." (M.H. 68). 
Appellant v/as driven in a patrol car to the police 
department around 11:00 p.m., about two hours after Susan's death 
(M.H. 75, 80). Appellant was left in a line-up room with 
48 Indeed, the keys were presented in evidence at trial 
(R. 560), although their relevance and probative value are 
abstruse at best. 
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Officer Cox (M.H. 69, 70; T. 244). Officer Edwards interviewed 
Appellant at about 1:10 a.m. (M.H. 75). Officer Edwards 
indicated that when he arrived at the police department, prior to 
questioning Appellant, he offered to let Appellant call a friend 
to come and pick him up (M.H. 70). Officer Edwards indicated 
that prior# to the taped interview, Officer Edwards read 
Appellant his Miranda rights, and told him he was not under 
arrest, but was free to leave (M.H. 71). Officer Edwards 
maintained that Appellant remained at the police department, in 
the line-up room with Officer Cox, "free to leave", until 6:15 
a.m., when he was placed under arrest (M.H. 73, 81). 
Because Appellant was suspected of homicide, and 
because his freedom of action was curtailed by the police from 
moments after they arrived until Appellant was formally arrested, 
Appellant should have been informed of his rights and those 
rights should have been honored. 
D. THE STATE FAILED TO INFORM APPELLANT OF HIS RIGHTS IN A TIMELY 
MANNER, AND VIOLATED THOSE RIGHTS ONCE APPELLANT INVOKED THEM. 
While the transcripts indicate that minutes after the 
investigating officers arrived, they suspected that Appellant 
had killed his wife, and while the trial transcript indicates 
that minutes after the investigating officers arrived, they began 
depriving Appellant of his freedom of action, the trial 
transcript does not demonstrate that Appellant was informed of 
his Miranda rights during the two hours that the officers 
50 But see Appendix 3, where it appears that Appellant's 
friend was not mentioned until well into the taped interview. 
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examined Appellant at his home. The admission of his statements 
made at his residence therefore violated Appellant's rights 
against self-incrimination under Article I section 12 of the Utah 
Constitution and the Fifth Amendment to the federal 
4. - 4 - *. • 5 1 a constitution. 
While Officer Edwards finally gave Appellant a Miranda 
warning when he interrogated him at the police department, 
immediately after the warning, Officer Edwards violated 
Appellant's federal right against self-incrimination when 
Appellant requested counsel and Officer Edwards neither clarified 
the request nor ceased the interrogation. See Appendix 3.; State 
v. Griffin, 754 P.2d 965, 969 (Utah App. 1988)("[W]hen an accused 
makes an arguably equivocal request for counsel during custodial 
interrogation, further questioning must be limited to clarifying 
the request. If the request is clarified as a present desire for 
assistance of counsel, all questioning must cease as if an 
initial unambiguous request had been made."). 
E. THE ADMISSION OF THE STATEMENTS WAS PREJUDICIAL. 
In opening argument, the prosecutor emphasized the 
importance of Appellant's statements, characterizing them as one 
of the two critical areas of evidence the jurors would focus on, 
and asked the jurors "most importantly" to "focus on what he 
said." (T. 183, 188). 
In closing argument, the prosecutor reiterated the 
51 a Salt Lake City v. Carner, Miranda v. Arizona, supra. 
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statements (894-902), characterizing the statements as 
"incredible and wildly inconsistent stories", and as "an outright 
lie." (T. 902). 
As demonstrated by the statement of facts and previous 
argument, without the statements, the State would have had to 
rely on inconclusive ballistics evidence. In these 
circumstances, it cannot be said that the admission of the 
statements was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, and Appellant 
is entitled to reversal of his conviction. 
V. 
THE TRIAL COURT VIOLATED 
UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE 402, 403, AND 802 
IN ADMITTING THE HEARSAY STATEMENTS OF SUSAN QUAS. 
On the morning of June 8, 1989, defense counsel moved 
the court for an order excluding statements made by Susan Quas to 
the police about month before her death that one day the 
officers would come to the Quas residence and find Mrs. Quas 
dead, to find that Mr. Quas had killed her (T. 271). The 
prosecutor argued that the statements were admissible because the 
defense had opened the door to the evidence by presenting in 
opening argument the theory that Susan Quas committed suicide (T. 
275). He also argued that the statements were relevant to the 
identity of the perpetrator (T. 278). The court denied the 
51b As the prosecutor later argued (T. 889), there was no 
question of identity in this case. 
As is explained infra, this latter argument of the 
prosecutor demonstrates that even the prosecutor did with this 
evidence what the jurors were instructed not to do. He thought 
the statements could be used as proof of the truth of the matter 
asserted, that John Quas killed his wife. While such reasoning 
is difficult to banish from the finest minds, it is improper• 
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motion to exclude the statements, but agreed to instruct the 
jurors about the limited use of the evidence after the testimony 
of the witness quoting the statements (T. 280-281). 
Officer Brooke Plotnick testified that on May 21st of 
1987, he responded to a family fight at the Quas residence, at 
which time Susan Quas, who was very intoxicated, told him that 
John Quas would kill her and the officers would find her dead one 
5 2 day (T. 285-286, 293). The statements were made the same night 
and an hour and a half before Susan Quas rode on the hood of the 
Quas automobile to a nearby gas station, where she was arrested 
for public intoxication and spouse abuse. See T. 744-754; 293-
295 (testimony of Officer Plotnick and two neighbors witnessing 
the incident). 
Officer John Wright was also allowed to testify that on 
May 16, 1987, he had responded to a family fight at the Quas 
residence, at which time Susan Quas, who was very intoxicated, 
told him that she was not the guilty one, and that one day 
53 
Appellant would kill her (T. 864). The statements were made 
52 It should be noted that these statements apparently 
were not recorded in the police report covering the incident, but 
after Officer Plotnick learned that Susan Quas was dead, he 
remembered the statements because, as he explained to the jurors, 
"Not too many people tell you that someone is going to kill 
them." (T. 296, 315). 
However, for some reason, he did not present the 
statements at the first preliminary hearing when he testified 
(P.H.I 5-23), or at the second preliminary hearing. 
53 It should be noted that yet again, the officer failed 
to note these statements in his initial police report covering 
the incident; but that Officer Wright rewrote his report to 
reflect the statement after Susan Quas died (T. 867). 
Officer Wright did not present these statements at the 
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the same night and apparently at that time that Susan was 
arrested for intoxication and spouse abuse after inflicting big 
bleeding scratches on Appellant's face. See T. 866-867; 791-793 
(testimony of arresting officer and Mark Knudson, who were 
present). 
A. THE STATEMENTS OF SUSAN QUAS, TAKEN IN CONTEXT, WERE 
IRRELEVANT. 
The only circumstance in which Susan Quas's statements 
might have been relevant would have been if her statements 
rebutted Appellant's defense that Susan Quas committed suicide. 
While in some cases, a hearsay statement that the declarant would 
be killed by someone might be interpreted as demonstrating a 
fearful state of mind implying a love for life on the part of the 
declarant, in the unique facts of this case, such an inference is 
unreasonable. 
If Susan Quas valued her life and were afraid that her 
husband would kill her, why, on the night of making those 
statements, did she jump on the roof of Appellant's car, and 
remain on the hood of the car, trying to break the windshield 
while he drove three blocks? (T. 744-746, 752, 754). If Susan 
Quas were afraid that her husband would kill her, why, once the 
car stopped moving at the gas station did she attack him, vowing 
to kill him, hitting him, choking him, and pulling his hair? (T. 
747, 752). And why on May 16th, did Susan physically attack 
Appellant when others were present if she feared for her life? 
first or second preliminary hearings. 
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The court gave repeated instructions on the theory of 
limited use of evidence. E.g. T 290-291, 864-865 R 585, 
issue of whether Susan Quas could have committed suicide about a 
month after she made the statements, the statements violated Utah 
Rules of Evidence 402 and 802.5 
B. THE ADMISSION OF THE STATEMENTS VIOLATED UTAH RULE OF EVIDENCE 
403 AND REQUIRES REVERSAL OF APPELLANT'S CONVICTION. 
Even if the states of mind reflected in Susan Quas's 
statements were relevant and thus admissible under the state of 
mind exception to the hearsay rule, because of their lack of 
56 Utah Rule of Evidence 402 provides: 
All relevant evidence is admissible, 
except as otherwise provided by the 
Constitution of the United States or the 
Constitution of the state of Utah, statute, 
or by these rules, or by other rules 
applicable in courts of this state. Evidence 
which is not relevant is not admissible. 
Utah Rule of Evidence 802 provides: 
Hearsay is not admissible except as 
provided by law or by these rules. 
Utah Rule of Evidence 801 defines hearsay as follows: 
.... 
(b) "Hearsay" is a statement, other than 
one made by the declarant while testifying at 
the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to 
prove the truth of the matter asserted. 
57 Utah Rule of Evidence 803 provides: 
The following are not excluded by the 
hearsay rule, even though the declarant is 
available as a witness: 
.... 
(3) A statement of the declarant's then 
existing state of mind, emotion, sensation, 
or physical condition (such as intent, plan, 
motive, design, mental feeling, pain, and 
bodily health), but not including a 
statement of memory or belief to prove the 
fact remembered or believed unless it relates 
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Appellant had ever acted in a violent way toward anyone prior to 
Mrs. Quas's statements• Six days after these statements were 
made to Officer Wright and two days after these statements were 
made to Officer Plotnick, Mrs. Quas told a fellow employee that 
her husband would never hurt her (T. 757). There was testimony 
that Mrs. Quas had a habit of drinking to excess (T. 245, 254, 
293, 510, 742, V79-78C) and was tired of being arrested (T. 770). 
Perhaps her statements to the officers were an effort to defl ect 
blame from,, h p r ^ i K -iri^ o n t o A n n e l l a n t . 
when the officers quoted them to the jurors. 
Inasmuch as the State presented expert witness 
testimony from the emergency room physician who treated Susan 
after her suicide attempt on May 3, 1987, (and hearsay testimony 
of the social worker who assessed Susan that day) to the effect 
that Susan was not a suicidal person (T. 721-735), there was no 
need to present Susan's statements to Officer Plotnick in an 
effort to rebut Appellant's theory that Susan Quas was a suicidal 
59 person. 
2. Prejudicial Effect 
In both State v. Wauneka, 560 P.2d 1377 (Utah 1977), 
and State v. Auble, 754 P.2d 935 (Utah 1988), the Utah Supreme 
Court emphasized the careful analytical approach that a trial 
court must take in evaluating the admissibility of the pre-death 
hearsay statements of a victim in a homicide case. The court 
60 
repeatedly urged first a scrupulous relevance inquiry, to be 
followed by a meaningful consideration of the inevitable 
61 
prejudice attendant to such statements. The court noted twice 
that curative instructions to jurors are unlikely to be 
59 See State v. Auble, 754 P.2d 935, 938 (Utah 1988)(part 
of probative value inquiry involves seeking alternate modes of 
proof of the assertion proved by the hearsay statements). 
60 See Wauneka, 560 P.2d at 1379-1381; Auble, 754 P.2d at 
937. 
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prejudicial error. 
VI. 
THE TRIAL COURT VIOLATED APPELLANT'S 
RIGHTS TO A FAIR TRIAL IN FAILING TO GIVE 
THE JURORS APPELLANT'S INSTRUCTIONS 
CONCERNING REASONABLE DOUBT AND 
APPELLANT'S ABSTINENCE FROM FI ,IGHT, 
x,. xiUAL COURTS ARE DUTY BUUNL I'o INSTRUCT JoRuRS APPROPRIATELY. 
--- - - " - - - " • ii '• * ' tre court 
discussed rue snort comings o: '_:,*. t*.^, . !S 
.Tee :u 51 n supn • W^ 11..* 
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in the context of specific intent instructions, general intent 
instructions, and the absence of the defendant's requested 
voluntary intoxication instructions. The court set forth the 
most elementary principles of law governing instruction of 
juries: 
The trial court has a duty to instruct the 
jury on the lav/ applicable to the facts of 
the case. Encompassed in this duty is the 
right of the defendant to have his theory of 
the case presented to the jury in a clear and 
understandable way. 
Id. at 78. 
The court noted that trial courts should not phrase 
instructions in vague legal abstractions, but should tailor the 
instructions to the facts in the case. Id_. at 79 and n. 3. 
The court concluded by explaining why the trial court's 
performance required reversal in that case: 
We believe a substantial likelihood exists 
that the instructions given in the present 
case, when considered together, confused and 
misled the jury in its deliberation on the 
principal issues of the case to the detriment 
of the defendant. The instructions failed to 
present to the jury in a clear and 
understandable manner the substance of the 
defense advocated by the defendant. The 
instructions thus constitute error which was 
prejudicial to the defendant and deprived him 
of a fair trial. 
Id. at 80. 
As is discussed infra, the trial court in the instant 
case refused Appellant's proposed jury instructions concerning 
the meaning of reasonable doubt and inferences to be drawn 
between lack of flight and lack of consciousness of guilt. In so 
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doing, the court violated Appellant, 's ricrht tc have the jury 
i. .•• ' -* : -ar and understandaMe ipanner concerning ; e 
law and Appellai it's theory oi *. -.: -*""' • 
Appellant's rights to a fair trial* 
P, 'I , '••'...:- rFT:'\\r • r,PKLI,,\Mn w- FLJGHT INSTRUCTION. 
AppelianL ' o : J^UHLIC . : . . J... i $ 
follows: 
The flight or attempted flight of a 
person immediately after the commission of a 
crime or after he is accused of a crime that 
has been commited [sic], is not sufficient in 
itself to establish his gui It; but such 
flight, if proved, may be considered by you 
in light of all other proven facts in the 
case in determining guilt or i nnocense [sic]. 
On the other hand, the fact that a., person did 
not flee after the occurrence of an incident, 
if proved, may also be considered by you in 
light of all other proven facts in the case 
*•• determining guilt or innocense. 
Consciousness of guilt may be inferred 
from flight, however, it does not necessarily 
reflect actual guilt of the crime charged, 
and there may be reasons for flight fully 
consistent with innocense. On the other 
hand, lack of consciousness of guilt may be 
inferred from the fact that a person did not 
flee; however, it does not necessari ly 
reflect actual innocense of the crime 
charged, and there may be reasons for lack of 
flight fully consistent with guilt. 
Therefore, whether or not evidence of flight 
or lack of flight shows a consciousness of 
guilt or lack of consciousness of guilt and 
the significance, if any, to be attached to 
any such evidence are matters exclusively 
within the province of the ;ury. 
. ..-- : . • : • • • • .j'.'tion was 
apparently written on the- instruction iy tne court. 
Requested by Defendant, but nwt_ given by 
the Court. Court concluded that if this 
instruction was given it in effect would be 
commenting on non-evidence, and clearly 
should be left to argument. 
(R. 595). 
Contrary to the trial court's ruling, the law of Utah 
does not forbid flight instructions as "comments on the 
evidence", but permits the use of flight instructions when the 
facts of the case warrant them. State v. Howland, 761 P.2d 579 
(Utah App. 1988); State v. Bales, 675 P.2d 573, 574-575 (Utah 
1983); State v. Gonzales, 517 P.2d 547 (Utah 1973); State v. 
Robison, 498 P.2d 658 (Utah 1972). 
The trial court's ruling might be read as a conclusion 
that it is improper to draw an inference from failure to act, 
where the opposite inference would legitimately follow from the 
action. However, in this jurisdiction, inferences may be drawn 
from failure to act. See e.g. State v. Smith, 706 P.2d 1052, 
1058 (Utah 1985)(trial court's duty to instruct includes 
instructions regarding inferences that might be drawn from 
failure to act (failure to call a witness supports a negative 
inference). 
C. THE COURT ERRED IN REJECTING APPELLANT'S PROPOSED REASONABLE 
DOUBT INSTRUCTION. 
During the voir dire of the prospective jurors in this 
case, the trial court instructed them as follows: 
The standard of proof in a criminal case 
is that the State has the burden of proving 
each and every element of the crime beyond a 
reasonable doubt. 
Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is that 
degree of proof that satisfies the mind and 
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convinces tl le understanding of those who are 
bound to act conscientiously upon it, 
A reasonable doubt is not one that is 
merely possible, fanciful or imaginary# 
because most everything relating to human 
affairs is open to some possible doubt. But 
a reasonable doubt is one which is real and 
substantial. It is a doubt based upon 
reason, and one which reasonable men and 
women would have upon a consideration of al 1 
the evidence. It must arise from the 
evidence or the lack of evidence in the case* 
If after an impartial consideration and 
comparison of all of the evidence you can 
honestly say that you are not satisfied of 
the Defendant's guilt, you have a reasonable 
doubt. But if after such impartial 
consideration and comparison of all the 
evidence you can truthfully say that you have 
an abiding conviction of the Defendant's 
guilt such as you'd be willing to act upon in 
the more weighty and important matters 
relating to your own affairs, you have no 
reasonable doubt. 
( _ _0-1 7)(emphasis added). 
The prosecutor in opening argument. i nstructed 11 Ie 
You'ii be instructed by the Court on what 
reasonable Joubt means. It doesn't mean 
imagination or speculation or remote 
possibility. It means a reasonable doubt; a 
doubt based on reason. Reason is what the 
State asks you to apply to the facts and the 
evidence cf this case. 
''* *V. .-< c o jnsel 
moved to strike Lhe panel because the court's reasonable doubt 
instruction inciuc-" T ^ rnuage that the rtah Supreme Court hod 
held improper in U a -.. - • . i e mil. *: -^ . ate v . Johnson ("'!". ' '?). 
After argument, r.he v.nr' denied "ne motion to strike the panel 
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The fallacy of the court's instruction is found by 
referring to Justice Stewart's dissent in State v. Ireland, 
P.2d 1375 (Utah 1989): 
Nothing that one ordinarily does in the 
course of a normal life span is comparable to 
the decision to deprive another of either his 
or her life or liberty by voting to convict 
for a crime. Profound differences exist 
between decisions to convict another person 
and decisions to enter into marriage, buy a 
home, invest money, have a child, or have a 
medical operation - or whatever else might be 
deemed a weighty affair of life. 
The mental process employed in deciding 
that someone has committed a crime beyond a 
reasonable doubt is different from the mental 
process employed in making decisions in the 
"more weighty affairs of life." In making 
the latter type decision, a person looks 
forward and makes a decision about future 
conduct. A degree of risk is always inherent 
in such a decision, and usually the degree of 
risk based on doubt about future events is 
significant. The process employed in making 
such decisions is only partly a matter of 
assessment of past facts; instead, the 
decision often rests on a degree of hope, 
determination, and frequently, personal 
resolve. In most cases, the decision is 
revocable, but whether or not revocable, it 
is at least salvageable. 
A decision to convict always looks 
backward; it is concerned only about 
resolving conflicting versions of factual 
propositions about a past event. It is 
always irrevocable as to the jurors. The 
process does not involve the decision maker's 
hope, determination, or willingness to 
undertake a personal risk. Rather, such a 
decision demands reason, impartiality, and 
common sense. A jury must have a greater 
assurance of the correctness of its decision, 
if it is to comply with the constitutional 
mandate, than the individual jurors are 
likely to have in making the "weighty" 
decisions they confront in their own lives. 
Id. at 1381 (citations omitted). Justice Stewart also 
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disapprovea » :" instructing jurors that ^ reasonable doubt is not 
IT..-. that- a possibility ^\aj constitute 
a reasonajjif -IOU^I . . ^  ...*«.. 
Ir should U: noted ihai the rrajorit^ in Ireland 
a . .v "ire "+'ci -:rt !< -'oncerns expressed 
i r ; is '.'iscusbiv-u ^ i ; .i -= m-.y x. e * e i '-'hi . « . ; a i L . • 
and also jc::ec. ^ r; h s condensation of I mgua^L- -i J 1 owing 
c . i ' - - : > ! drv,:h*:s -vist-. id. at 1380. 
See also State v. John^. - • 
(1989) (Just i.-e Stewart, joined by Justices Zimmerman and 
I
 ; :, _ justice Stewart's dissent 
in Ireland:• 
At -:-* »»rd o*-* th.e presentation of e. idence, defense 
counsel o:/.-.: • c n-\ J ' •: •. '* 
AppelJ ant ' s instruct JO: • :u- meaning o. xeaoona^a, ciou* *
 ? , n^cn 
follows: 
A l l j . -->uu;t"i. f law, independ ent of 
evidence, are in favor of innocence, and a 
defendant is presumed innocent until he is 
proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. And 
in case of a reasonable doubt as to whether 
a defendant's guilt is satisfactorily shown, 
he or she is entitled to an acquittal, 
I have heretofore told you that the 
burden is upon the State to prove the 
defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Now by reasonable doubt is meant a doubt that 
is based on reason and one which is 
recisonable in view of all the evidence. A 
recisonable doubt is a doubt which reasonable 
men and women would entertain, and it must 
arise from the evidence or the 1 ack of 
evidence in this case. 
If, after an impartial consideration and 
comparison of all the evidence in the case, 
you can candidly say that you have the kind 
of doubt which would cause a person to 
hesitate to act, you have a reasonable doubt. 
Deciding that someone has committed a 
crime beyond a reasonable doubt is different 
from making decisions concerning the more 
weighty affairs of life. In such affairs of 
life, a person looks forward and, based on a 
degree of hope, determination and personal 
resolve, makes a decision that involves a 
degree of risk. 
A decision to convict or not looks 
backward. It is always irrevocable as to 
your decision. It demands reason, 
impartiality and common sense. You must have 
a greater assurance of correctness of this 
decision than you normally have in making the 
weighty decisions in your life. 
(R. 596). 
The court wrote the basis for its rejection of the 
instruction on the instruction: 
Requested by Defendant, but not given 
by the Court (instruction #9 given). The 
reference to "more weighty affairs", is in 
any way, has the same potential for 
misleading the jury as to what "reasonable 
doubt" is. The "irrevocable" reference might 
mislead the jury to the conclusion that the 
Defendant is without any remedies, such as 
new trial, appeal, parole, etc., and make 
suggest without any remedies, such as new 
trial, appeal, parole, etc., and make 
suggest something about the severity of the 
penalty, without regard to the options 
available to the sentencing Judge. 
(R. 596). 
While the court's ruling is somewhat obtuse, the 
language of the requested instruction is a clear definition of 
reasonable doubt which comports with the Utah Supreme Court's 
understanding of the phrase "beyond a reasonable doubt". 
The jurors were first instructed about the meaning of 
reasonable doubt during the voir dire, in a manner conflicting 
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directly with the Supreme Court's opinions in Johnson, 774 P.2d 
1141, 1148-1149; and Ireland, 773 P.2d 1375, 1381. See language 
emphasized in court's instruction, supra, page 62-63. They were 
also encouraged by the prosecutor to accept the inadmissible 
professional conclusions of the expert witnesses that Susan Quas 
was a homicide victim as having met the standard of proof applied 
by those professionals, which standard supposedly met or exceeded 
the beyond a reasonable doubt standard of proof (T. 893-894, 
946). Rather than correcting these errors, the court gave an 
instruction that defines reasonable doubt in a manner that is 
even more circular and abstract than the definition condemned in 
Johnson and Ireland. Instruction 7 read as follows: 
All presumptions of law, independent of 
evidence, are in favor of innocence. A 
defendant is presumed innocent until he is 
proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. And 
in case of a reasonable doubt as to whether 
his guilt is satisfactorily shown, he is 
entitled to an acquittal. 
The burden is on the State to prove the 
defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Proof beyond a reasonable doubt does not 
require proof to an absolute certainty. A 
reasonable doubt is based on reason and 
common sense and not on speculation or 
imagination. It is a doubt that is 
reasonable in view of all of the evidence. 
Proof beyond a reasonable doubt must satisfy 
the mind and convince those who are bound to 
act conscientiously upon such proof. A 
reasonable doubt is a doubt that reasonable 
men and women would hold after consideration 
of the evidence or lack of evidence in the 
case. 
In this case, as in Ireland and Johnson, the jurors 
were left without a concrete understanding of the incomparable 
significance of their decision to take another's freedom because 
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the court's instructions concerning proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt were inadequate. 
As is demonstrated by reference to the statement of 
facts, supra, it cannot be said that beyond a reasonable doubt 
the jurors would have convicted Appellant, had they been 
instructed correctly. Appellant is therefore entitled to 
reversal of his conviction . 
CONCLUSION 
This Court should reverse Appellant's conviction, and 
order the case dismissed. 
w 
Respectfully submitted this Y \ day of April, 1990. 
EiyiZABETH H 
Attorney for 
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Excerpts from hearing on October 18, 1988 
before Magistrate Eleanor Van Sciver 
if you wish to follow through on prosecuting. 
As I said in the absence of the court reporter, 
but I'll repeat for your record on the transcript for the 
court reporter; last year, when I heard this case, 
Mr. McConkie was representing the State. A great deal of 
evidence, both Ms. Remal and I will recall this, and you 
probably will, Mr. Matheson, because you've reviewed the 
transcript. A great deal of evidence came before this Court 
with respect to gunshot residue tests and the effect and 
impact of shooting a firearm, and whether or not the 
individual shooting the firearm would have certain markings 
on his or her body, if in fact that individual had shot that 
firearm. And at the outset, I assumed that Mr. KcConkie was 
going to put a great deal of weight into the effect of the 
gunshot residue tests. 
And we had a discussion at the bar, and I'm not 
certain this is contained in the transcript, because to be 
perfectly honest, I remember the case, and I have not re-
read the transcript since you gave me the transcript. 
He approached the bench, I believe Ms. Remal was 
there also—and you can correct me if I'm wrong—and said 
that gunshot residue tests were not to be considered by the 
Court because they were scientifically so nebulous that one 
ought not to rely on it at all; but we got more and more 
evidence about gunshot residue tests. Now, is that a fair 
ROCKY MOUNTAIN REPORTING SERVICE. INC. 
statement? 
MS, REMAL: There was something to that effect. 
I donft remember the exact--
THE COURT: Well, I think it may have been a side 
bar conference. 
MS. REMAL: It was. 
THE COURT: With Mr. McConkie and the Court. 
MS. REMAL: Yeah. It was. 
THE COURT: And itfs not that I would have excluded) 
you, but I was wondering, you know, what—why are we—you 
know, are you going to rely upon these gunshot residue tests 
and we got into a discussion. No. 
Then the evidence went forward, we had a great deal 
of evidence about gunshot residue tests. The State ?ledical 
Examiner, Dr. Gray, took the stand, and testified that his 
opinion was based on this and this and this and gunshot 
residue tests. 
Now, there were some mental gymnastics that were 
attempted to be displayed before the Court; that is, that I 
can make my opinion absent the gunshot residue test. It was 
the conclusion of the Court that he could not; therefore, 
his opinion was not admissible. And that was really one of 
the important things for the Court, the fact that I would 
not consider the State Medical Examiner's opinion because he 
relied upon gunshot residue tests. 
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Now, if the State can present to me scientifically 
based evidence that gunshot residue tests can provide the 
basis for the opinion, then I think this Court is in a 
different posture. But it doesnft surround whether or not 
neighbors were—saw things or didn't see things, although 
that may be relevant, but I think that the most critical 
issue to me was whether or not I should consider gunshot 
residue tests as the basis for the opinion of the State 
Medical Examiner, as well as the other physical evidence thatj 
was presented about the scene of the crime. 
Now, does anybody want to talk about that? Yes? 
MR. MATHESON: Your Honor, first of all, I — 
THE COURT: For the record, Mr. Quas is not here. 
MR. MATHESON: That's right. The State ic not 
taking the position that a GSR test is scientifically 
nebulous; in fact, it's our intention to present GSR 
residue tests both with respect to the victim and with 
respect to a number of individuals who were involved with the| 
test-firing of the gun. And if that's what the Court is 
interested in hearing, that's certainly something that we 
want to present. 
Your statements, though, I think, do require a 
response and really a question, I think, and I'd like to 
hear from the defense on this, because since this case has 
been refiled, we run into some legal authority that raises 
ROCKY MOUNTAIN REPORTING SERVICE, INC. 
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1 some questions in my mind about what exactly the State 
2 needs to do, not only to establish probable cause, which in 
3 mY judgment, in reviewing the evidence, and what I expect to 
4 be presented here, should not be a problem for the State. 
I also donft think it would be a problem for the 
6 | State to meet the second issue, which I think you have to 
, decide now, which you didn't have to decide before, and that 
is whether we have met the due process requirements of 
State vs. Brickey, to refile this case. 
Now, if I just put on the GSR evidence, that may 
be enough for this Court in terms of probable cause. 
THE COURT: W e l l — 
MR. MATHESON: But I donft want to put us in the 
position of being vulnerable to the argument that we didn't 
put enough on to meet the State vs. Brickey refiling 
standard. And for that reason— 
THE COURT: And you may have to have some new 
evidence, Mr. Matheson. 
MR. MATHESON: That's — 
THE COURT: My question is, is because you changed 
prosecutors, can you change your mind? 
MR. MATHESON: Well, I don't think we're changing 
anything; what we're doing is presenting you additional 
evidence. And the question, I think, is how much new and 



















ROCKY MOUNTAIN REPORTING SERVICE, INC. 
TtM c v r u i v r r c DI A /~C CI '!TC - n 
to meet the refiling standards. That's the reason we think 
. we're—we really have no choice, but to error on the side 
I of caution to the extent this becomes a review issue later 
4 I on. And for that reason, we do have the next-door neighbor, 
and we do have some additional— 
THE COURT: Oh, and I'm not saying that you can't 
put that on. What I'm saying is that the issue that 
really troubled the Court from the get-go is the issue of 
gunshot residue and how that became so involved in the 
evidence that was presented, and then the Court was advised 
by the prosecutor at that time that the Court was to ignore 
that because it was scientifically invalid. 
MR. MATHESON: Well, my review of the transcript, 
at least, that may have been an off-the-record statement, 
but the prosecutor at that time, on the transcript,, did make 
an argument, and I think it was the correct argument under 
7 03 of the Rules of Evidence, but Dr. Gray should have been 
able to give his opinion based on the GSR test in any event. 
So, in terms of what's on the record, I don't see anything 
about scientific nebulousness, or anything else of that 
kind; and I would like to disabuse the Court that that's 
going to be the State's position, and I don't see that as 
being the State's position last time, but perhaps Mr. Stott 
can--(inaudible) me, 'cause I wasn't there. 
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Honor, as you know, I was here. I was not the lead counsel, 
but I was backing-up, so to speak, Mr. McConkie, And I 
don't know what he said at side bar, frankly, obviously, I 
wasn't there; but I do know our position was not that the 
GSR was not something that Mr. Gray could consider and could 
base his opinion on, and if Mr. McConkie gave you that type 
of indication, that's inconsistent with what we had olanned 
for, and I think was inconsistent with what he argued later \ 
on to the Court. j 
i 
THE COURT: Well, no, he didn't—I don't think he « 
argued, but he thought that the opinion could come in and he 
could play—and I think there was some discussion about j 
mental gymnastics on the record. And I questioned whether [ 
he could engage in that kind of intellectual—well, that he 
could intellectually remove himself. He said he could. But 
there was so much evidence of that gunshot residue and it . 
was so intertwined in his opinion, and it may have been the ! 
State's theory, I'm just telling you what Mr. McConkie told 
me. 
And Mr. McConkie may have presented a case that 
was not what everybody agreed was to be the theory of the 
case. 
MR. MATHESON: Well, are you saying then that if 
our theory now is that the GSR is something that is 
reliable, is acceptable in scientific opinion and something 
ROCKY MOUNTAIN REPORTING SERVICE, INC. 
that a medical examiner normally relies upon, we can 
establish that and the Court will now hear that evidence and 
maybe look upon it in a different light. 
THE COURT: Uh huh (affirmative). 
MR. MATHESON: If that is so, I think we can 
proceed to go forward. 
MS. REMAL: Your Honor, perhaps I could respond to 
that. 
I think that the first thing that the Court is 
required to do in this situation, since this is a refiling 
of the same charge is, under State vs. Brickey, decide 
whether or not there's new evidence. And we have given you 
a couple of cases, Mr. Matheson gave you some cases attached, 
using the Miranda, which I think speak exactly to that 
issue. 
It seems quite clear to me from the case law that 
new or previously unavailable evidence means—and this is 
from the Jones vs. State case, which was cited specifically 
and followed by our Court in State vs. Brickey; additional 
or new evidence does not mean that which was known to the 
State at the time of the first preliminary hearing or which 
could have been easily acquired. 
Based on the memorandum which Mr. Matheson provided! 
to us and to the Court and reviewing the summaries of what 
he intends to offer at the second preliminary hearing, it 
ROCKY MOUNTAIN REPORTING SERVICE, INC. 
APPENDIX 2 
Summary of preliminary hearings submitted 
by the State in an effort to justify refiling the information 
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"The prosecution is not required to introduce its entire 
case at the hearing. ...!f Anderson, 612 P. 2d at 786. "There is 
always a presumption that the State will strengthen its evidence 
at trial by production of everything favorable to support the 
charge." Matricia v. State, 726 P.2d 900, 903 (Okla. Crim. App. 
1986). Indeed, "the burden of putting on evidence at a 
preliminary hearing may be met entirely through circumstantial 
evidence." State v. Maynard, 596 P.2d 893, 895 (Okla. Crim. App. 
1979) (quoting Berryhill v. State, 568 P.2d 1306, 1310 (Okla. 
Crim. App. 1977)). 
Occasionally the State may in good faith miscalculate 
and present not only less than all the evidence it has but also 
less evidence than is sufficient to establish probable cause. In 
this regard, it is instructive that in State v. Brickey, the Utah 
Supreme Court, in adopting the Oklahoma approach to refiling, 
cited Harper v. District Court, 484 P.2d 891 (Okla. 1971), and 
described it as "holding that good cause to continue a preliminary 
hearing for further investigation might exist when a prosecutor 
innocently miscalculates the quantum of evidence required to 
obtain a bindover and further investigation clearly would not be 
dilatory." 714 P.2d at 647 n.S. 
III. SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE PRESENTED AT THE 
PRELIMINARY HEARING IN STATE V. QUAS 
CRIMINAL NO. 871005536 
At the preliminary hearing in State v. Quas held on July 
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witnesses and five exhibits. The State contended then, as it does 
now, that the evidence established Ma prima facie case against the 
defendant from which the trier of fact could conclude the 
defendant was guilty of the offense as charged.,f Anderson, 612 
P.2d at 783. Of particular importance was the expert testimony of 
Dr. Todd Cameron Grey, Assistant Medical Examiner for the State of 
Utah, who testified, based on his examination of Susan Quas, that 
4 
the manner of her death was homicide. 
The Court was not satisfied that the State had met its 
burden of showing probable cause and granted defendant's motion to 
dismiss. Accordingly, in addition to the evidence previously 
adduced, the State will present new and additional evidence to 
establish probable cause. The State, of course, does not start at 
square one because substantial evidence probative of probable 
cause was presented on July 23 and 31, L987. Indeed, if that 
evidence did not establish probable cause, it went a long way 
toward doing so. Therefore, for the Court's and the parties1 
benefit, that evidence is summarized briefly below. 
4
 "The pathologist is one of the best qualified experts on the 
subject of cause of death, and is the best qualified expert on the 
manner or mode of death. The pathologist's opinions are vital not 
only because of his expertise but also because other experts' 
opinions on these subjects are so often wrong." P. Gianelli § E. 
Imwinkelried, Scientific Evidence 680 (1986), 
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A. Brooke Plotnick 
Officer Brooke Plotnick of the West Valley Police 
Department testified that he received the dispatch call for this 
incident at 9:41 p.m. on June IS, 1987, and arrived at the Quas 
residence at 9:45. He observed the deceased Susan Quas lying on a 
sheet with a gunshot wound in her eye. Officer Plotnick also 
spoke with and observed defendant John Quas. Defendant Quas told 
Officer Plotnick that he—Quas--was in the shower, heard a bang 
noise, exited the shower, and found his wife on the living room 
floor. However, Officer Plotnick, who was within two feet of Mr. 
Quas when defendant made these statements, testified that Mr. Quas 
did not appear to have showered because the defendant's hands and 
face were dirty and because his hair was dirty and dry in parts 
and not soaked as if it had been washed. Tr. at 5-11, 17-21. 
Officer Plotnick further testified that he had been to 
the Quas residence three times before concerning "family 
fight[s].f! On one of these occasions, six weeks before the 
incident of June 15, Officer Plotnick arrested Susan Quas for 
spouse abuse. Tr. at 12-13. 
Finally, based upon his experience in responding to 
suicide-by-gunshot cases, Officer Plotnick testified that Susan 
Quasfs death did not appear to be a suicide because there was an 
absence of blood spattering around the body and an absence of 
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gunpowder on her face, and because the position of the body was 
inconsistent with suicide. Tr. at 15. 
B. Ronald T. Edwards 
Detective Ronald T. Edwards of the West Valley Police 
Department testified that he was called to investigate this matter 
and arrived at about 10:15 p.m. on June 15, 1987, at the Quas 
residence. Tr. at 25. He observed and talked with defendant Quas 
within twenty-five minutes of arriving. Tr. at 28, 51. 
Among other things, defendant Quas told Detective Edwards 
that he--Quas--had been arguing with his wife throughout the 
evening and that the fighting had escalated. Mr. Quas said he 
told Susan that he was leaving for Tonopah, Nevada, that he went 
into the bedroom, took off his clothes, put on his bathrobe, and 
went downstairs to put his clothes in the washer. Quas told 
Edwards that he came back upstairs and observed Susan !tdry-f i ring" 
the weapon. Susan told her husband she would kill herself if he 
left for Nevada. Quas said he then went to the bathroom to take a 
shower. He was in the shower for four to five minutes and heard 
an explosion. Mr. Quas then said he ran out of the shower, 
observed his wife, picked up the gun, put it back down, and then 
made a telephone call to #911. Tr. at 34-35. 
In spite of Mr. Quas!s representations about showering, 
Detective Edwards observed that Mr. Quas!s hands and fingernails 
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were dirty (Detective Edwards noted a grease mark on the right 
hand) and that his hair was dirty and sticking out on the side. 
Tr. at 32, 49-51. Detective Edwards testified that Mr. Quas did 
not appear to have showered. Tr. at 36. 
Detective Edwards also inspected the bathroom and shower 
at issue at about 11:00 p.m. and found that the towels, sink, 
shower door, shower soap dish tray, and the shower itself were all 
dry. Tr. at 37, 52. 
A primary factor in Detective Edwards' decision to arrest 
John Quas was the pattern of hot lead residue left on the face of 
Susan Quas--the "tattooing.fl Based on his experience in reviewing 
such patterns, Detective Edwards concluded that the gun was shot 
eighteen to twenty-four inches away from Susan QuasTs face. Tr. 
at 41-42. 
On June 26, 1987, Detective Edwards performed a test on 
the shower at the Quas residence. He turned it on for three to 
four minutes, turned if off, and inspected it at five minute 
increments up to thirty minutes. After thirty minutes the shower 
was still wet, including the shower nozzle, handles, wall, and 
soap cup. Tr. at 40-41. This testimony should be reconsidered in 
light of the anticipated testimony of Sergeant Spann. (See below.) 
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C, Robert W. Brinkman 
Robert W. Brinkman, a criminalist for the State of Utah 
Crime Laboratory, conducted test firings of the gun involved in 
this case. These tests served as one basis for the expert 
testimony of Dr. Todd Cameron Grey. 
Mr. Brinkman also testified for the defense concerning 
the stippling or so-called "tattooing" phenomenon, which describes 
the penetration of the flesh with powder particles from the muzzle 
of the weapon. Tr. at 173. He said that he would be surprised to 
find stippling unless the muzzle of the gun is within six to nine 
inches of the flesh. Tr. at 175. However, in giving this 
opinion, Mr. Brinkman never made specific reference to the gun in 
this case. Moreover, he said generally that penetration of the 
skin would depend on several factors--type of ammunition, caliber 
of weapon, configuration of powder in the cartridge, and length of 
barrel. Tr. at 173-74. Finally and most important, Mr. Brinkman 
has never performed an autopsy and has not examined Susan Quas and 
observed the stippling on her face. Dr. Todd Cameron Grey 
testified that a determination of exact range requires a 
comparison between the stippling on Susan Quas's body and the 
5 According to P. Gianelli § E. Imwinkelried, Scientific 
Evidence 721 (1986): "Most handguns using flake powdTr rarely 
cause stippling beyond 18 inches. Ball powder can stipple the 
body up to approximately 3 1/2 - 4 feet." 
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results of test firing the same weapon with the same ammunition. 
Tr. at 97. Mr. Brinkman did not do that, and he is not qualified 
to do that. 
D. Dr. Todd Cameron Grey 
Dr. Todd Cameron Grey, Assistant Medical Examiner, State 
of Utah, examined the body of Susan Quas and prepared an autopsy 
report. Tr. at 109. In his training and experience as of July 
1987, Dr. Grey had viewed approximately 400 homicide cases and 200 
to 300 gunshot wound suicide cases, and he personally had 
performed examinations of 100 to 200 gunshot wound suicide victims 
and of 100 gunshot wound homicide victims. He concluded that the 
manner of death in this case was homicide. Tr. at 148. His 
conclusion was based on several factors. 
First, the angle of the wound was inconsistent with an 
accidental shooting. Tr. at 110, 143-44, 151-52. 
Second, the location of the wound — the inside corner of 
the left eye--was, in Dr. Grey!s experience, fairly uncommon in 
suicide. Tr. at 143-44, 153. 
Third, there was a wide pattern of stippling surrounding 
the wound. Dr. Grey testified that he had "never seen a suicidal 
gunshot wound with the wide pattern of stippling that is seen in 
this case." He had seen a large number of cases in which 
stippling was on the body, and this case was similar to others in 
which he had participated. Tr. at 95-96. 
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Fourth, which is related to the stippling, Dr. Grey-
testified that in his experience suicide gunshot wounds are almost 
always contact wounds or inflicted within one or two inches of the 
body, whereas in this case there was an intermediate range wound, 
Tr. 93, 157-58. 
Fifth, Dr. Grey compared the stippling on Susan Quas's 
face with stippling patterns produced through test firings of the 
gun. See Exhibits 5 and 6. Based on this comparison, he 
concluded that the distance of the muzzle of the gun from Susan 
Quas's face was sixteen to eighteen inches when it was fired. Tr. 
at 141-42. Having measured Susan Quas!s arm, Dr. Grey further 
testified: "You can't get eighteen inches away and have the wound 
path as described holding the weapon in this manner." Tr. at 99, 
110-11. 
Sixth, although the foregoing was sufficient for Dr. Grey 
to reach his opinion, see Tr. at 144, he mentioned as further 
support gunshot residue (GSR) test results from the State Crime 
Lab. This information concerned a GSR test that Dr. Grey 
performed on Susan Quas and the State Crime Lab analyzed. The 
Court sustained defendant's objection to Dr. Greyfs referring to 
these test results. Tr. at 101-04. Because this information is 
"of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular 
field in forming opinions or inferences upon the subject," Rule 
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703, Utah R. Evid., see Tr. at 102-03, the State contends that Dr. 
Grey should have been allowed to testify concerning the GSR 
results because such nfacts or data need not be admissible in 
evidence.'1 Rule 703, Utah R. Evid.; see State v. Schreuder, 726 
P.2d 1215, 1223-24 (Utah 1986); Barson v. E.R. Squibb § Sons, 
Inc., 682 P.2d 834, 839 (Utah 1984). 
IV. SUMMARY PROFFER OF NEW OR PREVIOUSLY 
UNAVAILABLE EVIDENCE THAT JUSTIFIES 
REFILING OF THE CHARGE 
New and additional evidence to be presented at the 
preliminary hearing is summarized in the Information and briefly 
set forth here. The State reserves the right to call additional 
witnesses who have spoken with Mr. Quas since the death of his 
wife or who have observed Mr. or Mrs. Quas at any relevant time. 
The State further reserves the right to present any further facts 
or demonstrations that may be developed. 
A. James Gaskill and Dr. Grey 
The State intends to call James Gaskill, Director, 
Criminalistics Laboratory, Weber State College. Mr. Gaskill 
supervised numerous test firings of the gun at issue in this case 
at the Weber State College Crime Lab. After the test fires, 
gunshot residue samples were taken from the hands of the 
shooters. The GSR test in all cases was positive for gunshot 
residue. Moreover, gunshot residue was not detected on the 
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persons present during the tests or on those who handled the 
weapon after testing. Mr. Gaskill also will testify that the GSR 
samples taken by Dr. Grey from Susan Quas were tested and no 
gunshot residue was found. To Mr. Gaskill, this evidence 
demonstrates that Susan Quas did not fire the gun and did not 
commit suicide. The Weber State Crime Lab tests further 
corroborate and bolster Dr. Grey!s opinion that the manner of 
death was homicide. 
B. David Farr 
David Farr of the State Crime Lab will testify concerning 
a photograph that he took of the Quas gun being fired. This 
photograph complements and reinforces the opinions of Dr. Grey and 
Mr. Gaskill. 
C. Ronald T. Edwards 
The State also will present evidence that Detective 
Edwards, in the course of his investigation, observed fresh blood 
on the plastic carpet protector on the stairs of the Quas 
residence. Samples were taken and tests arranged by Mr. Gaskill 
showing the blood to be the same type as that of Susan Quas. 
Detective Edwards will testify that there was no blood splattering 
around the victim, which is uncommon in suicide cases. Detective 
Edwards also will testify concerning the freshly washed items 
recovered from the washing machine on June 15, which consisted 
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mostly 'of towels, in contrast to defendant Quas's statement that 
clothes were being washed to prepare for a trip to Nevada. 
Through Detective Edwards, evidence will be presented that the hot 
water heater in the Quas residence was broken and did not 
function. There was no other source of hot water for the shower 
in the house. Finally, on August 20, 1988, Detective Edwards 
returned to the Quas residence and performed a test on the shower 
again. This time he checked the shower for ninety minutes after 
running the water. Again, the shower was still wet. 
D. Edward Spann 
Sergeant Edward Spann of the West Valley Police 
Department will testify that he arrived at the Quas residence on 
June IS, 1987, a few minutes after Officers Cox and Plotnick 
arrived. He had been advised of John Quas's report that 
he--Quas--had been showering when the shooting occurred. Sergeant 
Spann spoke with Quas as the latter was standing in the hallway 
between the bathroom and the living room. Sergeant Spann observed 
that the robe John Quas was wearing was not clinging to him, that 
Quasfs hair was damp on top but dry below the surface, and that 
Quasfs hands and fingernails were dirty. Sergeant Spann further 
noticed that the plastic carpet runner between the bathroom and 
living room was dry. These observations led Sergent Spann to 
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inspect the bathroom, where he found the bathroom floor dry, the 
shower/bathtub dry, the shower head not dripping and dry, and the 
two towels on a rack dry. Sergeant Spann will testify that he 
inspected the shower within ten minutes of his arrival at the Quas 
residence, which was within twenty minutes of Quas's initial call 
for police assistance. After checking the bathroom, Sergeant 
Spann heard the washer running. Quas explained to Spann that he 
was washing his clothes to prepare for a trip to Tonopah, Nevada. 
E. Pam Young 
Pam Young, who lives next door to the home where Susan 
Quas was shot, will testify that on June 15, 1987, at about 9:15 
p.m. , she was walking past the Quas residence and could see John 
Quas through the living room window. Ms. Young proceeded to the 
front porch of her own home and sat there for about fifteen 
minutes, at which point paramedics and police arrived at the Quas 
residence. Between the time Ms. Young walked past the Quas 
residence to the time that the police and paramedics arrived, Ms. 
Young did not hear a gunshot or any other sound coming from the 
Quas home. On August 20, 1988, Detective Edwards arranged and 
supervised a test firing of the gun inside the Quas residence when 
Pam Young was located on her front porch. Ms. Young will testify 
that she heard the firing of the gun very distinctly on August 20, 
1988, and that she heard no similar sound on June 15, 1987. 
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F. Kris Knudson 
Kris Knudson will testify that in September 1987, shortly 
after the original preliminary hearing, John Quas made statements 
to her about the death of Susan Quas that are inconsistent with 
statements he made on the evening of June 15, 1987. For example, 
the evidence shows that defendant Quas told police officers on 
June 15 that he called the police immediately upon discovery that 
his wife had been shot. However, he told Ms. Knudson that after 
he found his wife shot in the living room, he went downstairs for 
a few minutes to check his wash before calling the police because 
Susan already was dead. The wash in question was found to contain 
primarily towels on June 15. However, defendant Quas told Ms. 
Knudson that he had been washing clothes* 
* * * * * 
The foregoing satisfies the standard of State v. Brickey, 
714 P.2d 644, 647 (Utah 1986), because "new or previously 
unavailable evidence has surfaced.n Indeed, there is now ample 
evidence for the Court to conclude that the charged offense has 
been committed and that defendant Quas committed it. 
CONCLUSION 
The State adheres to its position at the first 
preliminary hearing that sufficient evidence was presented at that 
time to establish probable cause. The Court reached a contrary 
APPENDIX 3 
Excerpts from transcript of interrogation of Appellant 
conducted at 1:10 a.m. at the police station by Officer Edwards 
This interview is with John Quasf the NCIC code is 0901, criminal 
homicide. Case number 87-15436. 
Edwards: John what is your full and correct name? 
Quas: Quas, 
Edwards: First name John. 
Quas: yes, 
Edwards: Middle name James? 
Quas: Yes. 
Edwards: Okay, what is your date of birth John? 
Quas: 11-16-50. 
Edwards: Okay, what is your address? 
Quas: 4165 S. 3376 W. Sunnybrook. 
Edwards: The reason we are here at the West Valley Police 
Department, John and myself Detective Ron Edwards is the death of 
John's wife Susan M. Quas. Cause of death is gunshot wound to 
the head. John for your safety as well as for my safety I am 
going to read you your rights per miranda. You have the right to 
have an attorney, John you have the right to remain silent, 
anything you say can and will be used against you in a court of 
law. You have the right to have an attorney present before--
during or after any questioning. You have the right to stop 
questions anytime if you wish. If you cannot afford an attorney 
one will be appointed to you by the courts. Do you understand 
these rights? 
Quas: Yes. 
Edwards: Do you still wish to speak to me at this time. 
Quas: I would rather have an attorney. 
Edwards: You would rather have an attorney. 
Quas: Yes because I don't know what is going on here. 
Edwards: Okay, what's going on is that we are going to ask you 
some questions about what happened tonight. 
Quas: I have no, I was in the shower. 
Edwards: Well I just want to start from the beginning, lets say 
about 5:00 o'clock this afternoon, what happened at 5:00, 5:30, 
6:00, 6:30 what could have lead up to her shooting herself. 
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Quas: You wouldn't hold that against me if I told you on 
tape, 
Edwards: This tape is for your protection, if it is on tape 
there is no way I can lie, there is no way you can lie, 
everything is right there. It is just part of the investigation. 
Quas: Okay what happened. 
Edwards: Do you wish to speak to me then. 
Quas: I don't know if it is safe or not, I didn't do 
anything. 
Edwards: If you did nothing then there is nothing to worry 
about. 
Quas: I was in the shower. 
Edwards: We are not going to throw something at you that is not 
fair, what we are doing is what we do on every death. Everytime 
there is a death this is what we do. I mean we don't go around 
looking for reason to hang anybody. 
Quas: There was no reason, there was no reason for her to do 
that, there was no reason at all. 
Edwards: Why do you think she did it for. 
Quas: Because she drinks too damn much, that!s the reason, 
she drinks too much, she won't listen to me, she won't listen to 
anybody. I told her quit it, I said please stop, just stop once. 
Edwards: When did you tell her to stop drinking. 
Quas: This was been probably clear back when we lived in 
Elko, Nevada, please will you stop drinking so much, you get so 
nuts, you don't know what you are doing. 
Edwards: How long has she been drinking like this? 
Quas: I don't know, I've known her probably for 13 years, 
Edwards: And you have been married for 3 years, 
Quas: Yea, our anniversary was coming up, and I said don't 
you think with all the trouble that we are having, don't you 
think that maybe I should leave for a couple of weeks, I said 
maybe for a couple of weeks, and she said if you leave I will 
shoot myself, and I was washing my clothes. Well she has taken 
that gun out before and played with it, she has pointed it at me, 
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Quas: 5'9", I quess, I don't know I never looked. I just 
couldn't believe it. All I could do I mean I was in the service 
and I've seen alot of really strange stuff, okay, I mean alot of 
really strange things, but I don't think I am going to get ovei 
this, 
Edwards: This is going to be really hard. 
Quas: This is something that I am going to have to live witl 
because there are not, anybody better not say anything because 
loved that girl with everything in my heart, I loved her so much 
but she could not stay away from the booze and the drugs. Sh< 
would not listen to a damn (inaudible) in fact if you guys eve 
need a good detective I am qualified. 
Edwards: Where did you use to be a cop at? 
Quas: Well I was a Maryland State patrolman for about nin 
months because I didn't like it. Then I was a military policema 
with CID & PMI, and I can show you on DDT14, and if I could catc 
every kid, I mean I am talking about alcohol, drugs, I don't car 
what I would tell them you know what you are going to do to you 
life. You are going to go through the same thing that I am goin 
through right now, and I will never forget this. I can't, 
can't even live in that house anymore. 
Edwards: After you leave here who are you going to go stay with 
Quas: I think I will call Russ or something, I told that gu 
put me in jail, I would be just as happy to be in jail, I reall 
would. 
Edwards: Whose Russ? 
Quas: Oh this is a friend of mine he is really nice, Rus 








How do you spell his last name? 
W A G H E R , he can tell you how drunk she gets. 
I'm sorry W A 
W A G H E R . 
Where does he live at. 
I would have to call him on the phone. 
What is his phone number. 
Page Ten 
87-15436 
Quas: Well see I have it written down in the little brown 
book I have at home. I would let you guys know anything that you 
want to know. 
Edwards: Well, the thing it is you can call him from here and 
have him come pick you up, 
Quas: It's just that I canft believe that she would get so 
smashed so would do something like this, I never thought. I 
thought she would have more brains than that, she is a smart, 
smart girl, but I didn't think she was dumb enough to do anything 
like this. 
Edwards: Some people just get so wacked out that anything is 
possible. 
Quas: I just didn't think she would, I had no idea. She was 
talking really strange, she started talking to herself ont he 
stairs, but I wasn't paying attention I was going out to the 
garage. I was just going oh you know, that's the way it goes. I 
said I think I should leave for a couple of weeks, and I started 
washing my clothes, and I said I am going to take a shower, and 
while I was in the shower I heard this bang, I mean it was like 
this boom. 
Edwards: How long was you in the shower? 
Quas: I wasn't there more than probably 4 minutes, I think 4 
or 5 minutes. Then I came out and I didn't know what to do, it's 
killing me I am not going to know what to do with the rest of my 
life. 
Edwards: Do you have any idea what time it happened? 
Quas: I didn't look honest to god, I mean if I could tell you 
the truth I would tell you the truth, I didn't look at a clock. 
Edwards: Why don't you. 
Quas: This ring was given to me by a guy in the Navy because 
I was in Vietnam, so he gave me a ring. I don't know why, if I 
could tell you as a detective I would tell you, shit you would be 
a psychiatrist then I quess. I don't know why I have no idea. I 
won't be able to live, I mean I have to go back to (inaudible) or 
go to counseling. I mean I wish that I could hear her voice right 
now, she could scream at me all she wants, she use to scream at 
me all the time. 
Edwards: Why did she use to scream at you. 
Quas: I played guitar, and I was Wayne Newton's guitar player 
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trying to hustle me I don't know. And she just took it and she 
went across her arm and I went are you crazy or something, I said 
people don't do things like that Susan, and she just did it 
anyway. I don't know what else to tell you I mean I am sick# I 
am, like I say, 
Edwards: One thing you said that you picked up the gun, you 
touched the gun, 
Quas: yea I reached over and grabbed it, yea cause I thought 
she was faking me out or something. Where was it at, it was 
sitting, I think to her right by her stomach, and I looked and I 
thought god she is not faking. So I just ran right over and 
called 911. 
Edwards: So where did you grab it at, where did you touch it at? 
Quas: I wish I knew, 
Edwards: Okay, but you did touch it? 
Quas: Yea I did touch it. 
Edwards: We will need to take your fingerprints tonight so that 
we can match it up. You have no objections to that? You don't 
have to do anything, you know, 
Quas: Should I get a lawyer? 
Edwards: I don't see why you would need one right now? All we 
are doing is investigating the death of your wife, you know its 
awful hard I understand that, we try to be as compassionate and 
caring as we can, but we still have to do our job. 
Quas: She didn't have to do this. 
Edwards: No they don't. Why they do it, if we ever figured that 
out I would be working at the male clinic. 
Quas: She didn't have to do it, not over booze. 
Edwards: That's where they usually start drugs or booze. You 
say that she was against religion, did she ever practice in the 
occult or anything? 
Quas: She just didn't like Mormonism and I did. 
Edwards: Are you LDS? 
Quas: Not yet, I just have people who want me to be. 
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Constitutional and statutory provisions not in text of brief 
Constitution of Utah, Article I section 7 [Due process of law] 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or 
property, without due process of law. 
Constitution of Utah, Article I section 10 [Trial by jury] 
In capital cases the right of trial by jury shall 
remain inviolate. In courts of general jurisdiction, 
except in capital cases, a jury shall consist of eight 
jurors. In courts of inferior jurisdiction a jury 
shall consist of four jurors. In criminal cases the 
verdict shall be unanimous. In civil cases three-
fourths of the jurors may find a verdict. A jury in 
civil cases shall be waived unless demanded. 
Constitution of Utah, Article I section 12 [Rights of accused 
persons] 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have 
the right to appear and defend in person and by 
counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the 
accusation against him, to have a copy thereof, to 
testify in his own behalf, to be confronted by the 
witnesses against him, to have compulsory process to 
compel the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf, 
to have a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of 
the county or district in which the offense is alleged 
to have been committed, and the right to appeal in all 
cases. In no instance shall any accused person, before 
final judgment, be compelled to advance money or fees 
to secure the rights herein guaranteed. The accused 
shall not be compelled to give evidence against 
himself; a wife shall not be compelled to testify 
against her husband, nor a husband against his wife, 
nor shall any person be twice put in jeopardy for the 
same offense. 
